NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Tuesday held non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character.
The top court that it was not mandatory for a candidate in election to disclose each moveable asset held by him or family, as the voter's right to know is not absolute.
A bench of Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar said it is not necessary that a candidate in an election must declare every item of movable property that he or his dependent family members owned, such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture, etc, unless the item is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle.
"We are not inclined to accept the blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate. His right to privacy would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office," the bench said.
The bench set aside July 17, 2023 judgment of Itanagar bench of High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, which held 2019 election of Karikho Kri as independent MLA from Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency, as void, on a petition by Congress candidate Nuney Tayang.
The HC found Kri did not disclose vehicles namely Kinetic Zing Scooty, Maruti Omni Van, and TVS Star City Motorcycle.
"Such non-disclosure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an attempt on his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section 123(2) of the Representation of People Act of 1951," the bench said.
The court pointed out Kri had declared the value of the movable assets of his dependent family members and himself as Rs 8,41,87,815.
The value of the three vehicles in question, by comparison, would be a mere miniscule of this figure, which could not be said to amount to undue influence, the bench said.
The court said every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character.
The bench said a candidate and his family who own several high-priced watches, which would aggregate to a huge figure in terms of monetary value, would obviously have to disclose those as they constitute an asset of high value and also reflect upon his lavish lifestyle.
However, if a candidate and his family members each own a simple watch, not highly priced, suppression of the value of such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would, therefore, have to be judged on its own facts, the bench said.
In the case, the High Court had found that the nomination of Kri was improperly accepted by the returning officer as he had failed to disclose the three vehicles in question, which continued to be registered in the name of his dependent family members.
Besides, non-submission of the No Dues Certificate in respect of the government accommodation occupied by him during his earlier tenure as an MLA was also held to weigh against him.
The High Court also held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by Kri and his wife was a defect of substantial character and the same tainted his nomination.
The election petition was filed by the then Congress candidate, Nuney Tayang, challenging the declaration of the 2019 assembly election result.
The court also said the failure on the part of Kri to disclose the dues of municipal/property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same cannot be held to be a non-disclosure at all.
We hold that the High Court was in error in concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 to invalidate the election of Kri and, further, in holding that non-disclosure of the three vehicles, that still remained registered in the names of his wife and son as on the date of filing of his nomination, amounted to a corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951,
the court said.
