New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India, on December 11, 2025, delivered a landmark judgment in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato & Ors., arising from the tragic 2010 derailment of the Jnaneswari Express. While acknowledging that the High Court had erred in granting bail, the Apex Court refused to interfere with the liberty already granted to the accused, considering their prolonged incarceration spanning over a dozen years and the prosecution’s failure to demonstrate any misuse of bail during the past three years.
The Bench, comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, addressed four critical issues, including the applicability of Section 436-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and the balancing of Article 21 rights against national security concerns in cases involving the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).
The Court definitively ruled that Section 436-A of the CrPC—which provides for release on bail after half the maximum sentence is served—does not apply to the accused in the present case. The judgment noted that the accused are being tried for offences including Section 302 IPC and Section 16 of the UAPA, where “one of the possible punishments prescribed is death. That, in and of itself, excludes these offences from the ambit of Section 436-A CrPC.” Consequently, the Court held that the High Court’s reliance on this provision was flawed and set aside the impugned judgments “to that extent.”
On the core constitutional question of liberty under Article 21, the Supreme Court observed that individual rights are subservient to the nation’s interest in grave cases. The Bench noted, “In view of the discussion made above that the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation’s interest, the High Court fell in error in granting bail.” The Court acknowledged the “grave and serious impact” of the offence, stating that it “strike[s] at the nation’s security and are an effort to undermine its sovereign authority.” However, the Court ultimately declined to cancel the bail, holding that interference “would not be justified” at this stage, particularly as the accused had “already been in prison for a dozen years.”
The judgment placed strong emphasis on the systemic challenges posed by statutes such as the UAPA, which impose a reverse burden of proof. The Court explained that “a terrorist act is an act done with intent or likely intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India.” Such acts—especially those involving explosives, causing death, or disrupting monetary stability—qualify as terrorist acts and mandate a reverse burden of proof on the accused under Section 43-E of the UAPA.
Addressing the inherent difficulty in defending such cases, the Court highlighted the severe limitations faced by incarcerated accused persons in rebutting the presumption of guilt, observing: “An incarcerated accused would have severely limited access to evidence, witnesses and investigative material.” The Bench stressed the grave implications of procedural delay when combined with a reverse burden, stating that this doctrinal inversion “becomes all the more pernicious on account of procedural delays, and the very liberty of a person becomes hostage to clogged dockets, overworked judges, a lax prosecution, repeated adjournments by members of the Bar, and much more.”
The Court underscored the State’s corresponding obligation, holding: “If the State, in spite of all its might, presumes guilt, then the same State must also, with the employment of all the resources at its command, create pathways through which the accused can reclaim their innocence.” It concluded that “a constitutional democracy does not legitimise burdens by simply declaring them; it must ensure that those burdened are meaningfully equipped to bear them—even those accused of the gravest offences imaginable.”
To address systemic delays in UAPA and similar cases, the Court issued sweeping directions in rem to all High Courts and State Legal Services Authorities. The Chief Justices of all High Courts were requested “to examine the number of cases pending within their States under laws such as the UAPA, which impose a reverse burden of proof on the accused,” and “to ascertain the number of special courts designated to try such offences.” The Court further directed that in cases pending for more than five years, the concerned courts must “take stock of the situation… refrain from granting adjournments on routine requests and take up the matter on a day-to-day basis.”
In the present case (directions in personam), the Trial Court was directed to “take stock of the matter and record in its order the status thereof and the reasons for the trial having remained pending for many years,” and thereafter ensure that the matter “shall be taken up on a day-to-day basis,” strictly eschewing adjournments.
