New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case when there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, while setting aside a High Court judgment that had acquitted a man of murdering his wife by setting her on fire.
The Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadev delivered the judgment on January 15, 2026, while allowing a criminal appeal filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh challenging the acquittal order passed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court.
The prosecution case was that on December 7, 2009, Chaman Lal (the respondent-husband) poured kerosene on his wife, Saro Devi, at their residence in Village Rampur, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. Villagers rushed to her rescue, and the respondent also attempted to extinguish the fire. The deceased sustained severe burn injuries to the extent of 70%, while the respondent sustained about 3% burn injuries on his hand. Despite treatment, she succumbed to her injuries on January 15, 2010.
On December 8, 2009, Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate Amar Singh recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at the hospital after medical certification of her fitness and in the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Investigating Officer. In her statement, the deceased categorically stated that her husband had set her on fire after insulting her by calling her a “Kanjri” (woman of bad character).
After investigation, a challan under Section 302 IPC was filed. The Sessions Judge, Chamba, convicted the respondent under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of ₹50,000, with simple imprisonment for three years in default. The High Court, however, set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent by extending him the benefit of doubt.
The State challenged this acquittal before the Supreme Court. Counsel for the State submitted that the High Court erroneously discarded the dying declaration on the sole ground of alleged discrepancies relating to the time of arrival of the Tehsildar at the hospital. The High Court had relied selectively on one statement while failing to appreciate that multiple witnesses consistently stated that the Tehsildar reached the hospital around 11:00–11:15 a.m.
The State contended that the High Court wrongly relied on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and defence witnesses, including a ward member who, for the first time, introduced a version that the deceased had poured kerosene upon herself, and the respondent’s paternal aunt, whose testimony was naturally biased. The High Court had also accepted the testimony of the respondent’s minor son, who claimed that his father was working in the kitchen garden at the relevant time—contradicting the Investigating Officer’s statement.
The amicus curiae for the respondent argued that the dying declaration was suspicious and not worthy of reliance. He submitted that in the earliest FIR, the deceased’s brother stated that when he asked his sister who had set her on fire, she did not disclose any name. The presence of police officers at the time of recording the dying declaration, it was argued, cast doubt on its authenticity. He also contended that no motive was established for the respondent to set the deceased on fire.
The Supreme Court examined the scope of appellate interference with acquittal orders, noting that while ordinarily slow to interfere, the Court may do so where the High Court has adopted a wholly erroneous process of reasoning, misread material evidence, or ignored vital circumstances resulting in grave miscarriage of justice.
The Court reviewed the settled legal principles governing dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. Relying on Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay and Paniben v. State of Gujarat, the Court reiterated that a dying declaration need not be corroborated if found voluntary, truthful, and reliable; that it stands on the same footing as other evidence; and that conviction can rest solely on a dying declaration if it inspires confidence.
The Court held that the dying declaration in the present case inspired full confidence. It was recorded by a neutral and independent public officer after obtaining medical opinion regarding fitness. The Tehsildar categorically stated that the deceased was conscious, oriented, and capable of making a statement, which was corroborated by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the brother of the deceased. The declaration clearly attributed the act of pouring kerosene and igniting the fire to the respondent, bore the thumb impression of the deceased, and was recorded in the presence of senior officers. There was no material suggesting tutoring, coercion, or manipulation.
The Court rejected the High Court’s grounds for disbelieving the dying declaration. On the alleged inconsistency regarding time, the Court noted that the deceased’s brother initially made a vague reference to the evening but, upon clarification, categorically stated that the statement was recorded around 11:30 a.m., aligning with other testimonies. Such a minor discrepancy did not go to the root of the prosecution case.
On the manner of recording, the Court held that recording a dying declaration under the supervision of a Magistrate does not render it invalid. No suggestion was put to the Tehsildar in cross-examination that he did not record the statement. The law does not prescribe any rigid form for recording dying declarations, and hyper-technical objections cannot form the basis for rejection.
The Court acknowledged that the FIR recorded that the deceased did not initially name the assailant but held that an FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire prosecution case. At that stage, the immediate concern was the victim’s survival. Such omission cannot ipso facto discredit a subsequent dying declaration recorded in accordance with law.
Regarding hostile and defence witnesses, the Court held that their testimony can be relied upon only to the extent corroborated by other reliable evidence. The ward member and the respondent’s aunt were declared hostile, and their versions were essentially hearsay and never disclosed at the earliest opportunity. The defence witness admitted reaching the spot only after the deceased had caught fire, and the minor son did not claim to have witnessed the act of pouring kerosene or igniting the fire.
The Court rejected the plea of self-immolation, noting that the respondent’s conduct in attempting to extinguish the fire and sustaining minor burns does not exonerate him from culpability. Such conduct can equally be consistent with an attempt to create an appearance of innocence after the commission of the offence.
On the issue of motive, the Court held that motive assumes significance primarily in cases based on circumstantial evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case. The Court relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah, Dasin Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, and Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi).
The Court noted that the evidence disclosed that the respondent subjected the deceased to frequent quarrels, humiliation, and verbal abuse, including branding her a “Kanjri” and repeatedly asking her to leave the matrimonial home. The dying declaration itself referred to persistent matrimonial discord and ill-treatment, furnishing a plausible background for the commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is not required to establish motive with mathematical precision.
The Court concluded that, upon an overall appraisal of the evidence, the dying declaration was voluntary, truthful, and reliable. It was recorded by a competent authority when the deceased was conscious, oriented, and capable of making a statement. Minor discrepancies highlighted by the High Court did not create any dent in its credibility. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the offence under Section 302 IPC.
The Court held that the trial court correctly relied upon the dying declaration and surrounding circumstances to record conviction. The High Court erred in discarding this crucial evidence on speculative and hyper-technical grounds and in placing undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile and defence witnesses.
Emphasizing that each case must turn on its own facts, the Court observed that judgments do not lay down any absolute proposition that a dying declaration must invariably be discarded in the absence of corroboration.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment of acquittal, and restored the trial court’s judgment of conviction and order of sentence. The respondent was directed to surrender forthwith to undergo the remaining sentence, failing which the trial court shall take appropriate steps in accordance with law.
Case Title: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
