New Delhi: On February 3, 2026, the Supreme Court Collegium took a decisive step to address the severe judicial crisis in India’s largest High Court by approving the appointment of five retired judges as ad hoc judges to the Allahabad High Court. This significant move recommended Justices Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, Mohd. Aslam, Syed Aftab Husain Rizvi, Renu Agarwal, and Jyotsna Sharma for a two-year tenure under the rarely invoked Article 224A of the Constitution of India.
The Allahabad High Court has been struggling with a staggering backlog of approximately 11.55 lakh pending cases while operating at less than its sanctioned strength, with only 110 judges against a required strength of 160. This shortfall has necessitated exceptional measures to ensure the effective administration of justice.
The legal foundation for these appointments, Article 224A, allows the Chief Justice of a High Court to request a retired judge from that or any other High Court to sit and act as a judge, provided there is prior consent from the President of India and the personal consent of the retired judge concerned. Historically, this provision was removed in 1956 but was reintroduced by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, to utilise the expertise of experienced judges for difficult cases or for clearing arrears.
Before this recent development, Article 224A had remained largely dormant, with only three recorded instances of its use over more than six decades: the 1972 appointment of Justice Suraj Bhan in Madhya Pradesh, the 1982 appointment of Justice P. Venugopal in Madras, and the 2007 appointment of Justice O.P. Srivastava in Allahabad for the Ayodhya title dispute.
The contemporary framework governing these appointments was revitalised by the Supreme Court’s 2021 ruling in Lok Prahari v. Union of India, which activated the provision to deal with the nationwide explosion of pending cases. This judgment laid down strict trigger points for invoking Article 224A, including situations where judicial vacancies exceeded 20 per cent of the sanctioned strength or where more than 10 per cent of pending cases were over five years old.
However, in a landmark modification dated January 30, 2025, a three-judge Bench led by the Chief Justice of India significantly relaxed these conditions to facilitate more frequent use of the provision. The Court suspended the 20 per cent vacancy threshold, allowing High Courts to seek ad hoc reinforcements even when they are closer to full strength, provided the backlog remains substantial. The revised framework capped the number of ad hoc judges at 10 per cent of the sanctioned strength—generally translating to two to five judges per High Court—and mandated that they sit on benches alongside sitting judges, primarily to decide long-pending criminal appeals.
The appointment procedure follows the collaborative workflow between the executive and the judiciary as laid down in the Memorandum of Procedure of 1998. The process begins with the Chief Justice of the High Court communicating the recommended names to the State’s Chief Minister, who forwards them to the Union Law Minister after consulting the Governor. In line with the Lok Prahari guidelines, these recommendations must be routed through the Supreme Court Collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and the two senior-most judges, ensuring an additional layer of judicial scrutiny.
Once appointed, ad hoc judges enjoy the same jurisdiction, powers, and privileges as permanent High Court judges, though they are not deemed to be judges of that court for other constitutional purposes, such as transfers. Their tenure is generally fixed between two and three years, providing a temporary yet stable augmentation of judicial manpower. In terms of remuneration, they receive salaries and allowances equivalent to those of permanent judges, excluding pension, with such expenditure charged to the Consolidated Fund of India.
To safeguard institutional integrity, ad hoc judges are strictly barred from engaging in any other legal work during their tenure, including private practice, advisory roles, or arbitration. A notable advantage of this mechanism is that, as the appointees are former judges who have already undergone the full constitutional appointment process, the procedure can bypass time-consuming Intelligence Bureau checks, potentially reducing the overall processing time to around three months.
Despite its practical utility in harnessing experienced judicial talent to reduce long-pending cases, the use of ad hoc judges is widely regarded as a transitory mechanism rather than a substitute for regular appointments. Supporters view it as part of a multi-pronged strategy to tackle arrears, enabling judges who are free from administrative and admission-related duties to focus exclusively on clearing the oldest cases.
Critics, however, caution that excessive reliance on temporary appointments may foster systemic complacency, discouraging the timely filling of permanent vacancies and delaying deeper structural reforms. Concerns have also been raised about judicial independence, particularly the risk that retired judges seeking post-retirement assignments may face perceived conflicts of interest. Ultimately, while recent Supreme Court orders have paved the way for broader use of Article 224A, there is a broad consensus that ad hoc appointments should remain a supplementary measure, complemented by long-term reforms, improved infrastructure, and the prompt filling of permanent judicial positions to ensure a sustainable and effective justice delivery system.
