New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that applications seeking extension of time to conclude arbitration proceedings under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed before the civil court having original jurisdiction, even in cases where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11.
The Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice R. Mahadevan settled the divergent views of various High Courts on the interpretation of the term “Court” under Section 29A, emphasizing that the statutory definition under Section 2(1)(e) must be followed unless the context requires otherwise.
The Court was hearing civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10944–10945 of 2025 filed by Jagdeep Chowgule, challenging the Bombay High Court’s order which held that applications for extension of time must be filed before the High Court when the arbitrator was appointed by it. The Court reframed the core question as:
“If an arbitral tribunal—appointed by the High Court or by the parties concerned—does not complete proceedings within the required or extended time limit, can an application to extend time under Section 29A of the Act be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court?”
Addressing the divergent judicial views, the Court noted:
“A large number of decisions of the High Courts on the interpretation of Section 29A of the Act can be categorized into the following two streams.”
The first stream held that the expression “Court” in Section 29A refers to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e), while the second stream interpreted “Court” contextually to disapply Section 2(1)(e) where arbitrators were appointed by the High Court.
Rejecting the misconception regarding hierarchical difficulties, the Bench observed:
“It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a defined term must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to it ‘unless the context otherwise requires.’”
The Court emphasized the limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 11, stating:
“The exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 stands exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. There is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court or the Supreme Court over the arbitral proceedings after the appointment is made.”
On the nature of the appointment function, the Bench remarked:
“It is a misconception to assume that the Supreme Court or the High Court keeps a watch on the conduct of arbitral proceedings or the making of the arbitral award, like Orwell’s ‘Big Brother is watching you’. The referral court becomes functus officio once the appointment has been made; it has no role or function as a sub judice sentinel.”
Addressing concerns regarding jurisdictional anomaly, the Court held:
“We are of the opinion that the conclusion that there will be hierarchical difficulties, conflict of power, or jurisdictional anomaly if a Civil Court entertains an application under Section 29A for extension of time—where the High Court under Section 11(6) has appointed the arbitrator(s)—is untenable. This approach is hereby rejected.”
Clarifying the correct interpretation, the Court ruled:
“The ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the Supreme Court acting under Section 11(6) of the Act.”
On the power of substitution, the Court observed:
“The vesting of the power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is with the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e). The text as well as the context for identifying the Court under Sections 29A(4) and 29A(6) is the Court defined in Section 2(1)(e).”
Rejecting a status-based approach to jurisdiction, the Bench noted:
“Interpretation based on the perception of the status or hierarchy of courts is opposed to the fundamental conception of the rule of law. It is apt to refer to Dicey’s famous statement that ‘however high you may be, the law is above you.’ Law, and law alone, is the source of power.”
On the exhaustive nature of the statutory definition, the Court held:
“Section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive definition, identifying only the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the State, and no other court, as ‘court’ for the purposes of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996.”
The Court also clarified the inapplicability of Section 42, observing:
“Section 42 would not apply to applications made before the Chief Justice or his delegate, for the simple reason that the Chief Justice or his delegate is not a ‘court’ as defined under Section 2(1)(e).”
Allowing the appeals, the Court set aside the reference order of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024 dated 07.08.2024 and the subsequent judgment of the Single Judge dated 21.08.2024, and restored the judgment of the Commercial Court in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 20/2023/A dated 02.01.2024.
The Court further directed that parties are at liberty to move the Commercial Court for further extension under Section 29A(5), and that the Court shall consider the application, hear the parties, and pass appropriate orders.
Case Title: Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors.
