Children Cannot Prevent Aged Parents From Enjoying or Selling Property: MP High Court [Read Order]

Jabalpur: The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur has held that children cannot casually approach courts to prevent their aged parents from enjoying or dealing with their property, and that to restrain a father from alienating or enjoying property at the instance of his own children, a very strong prima facie case must be made out by the children to establish their birthright and the existence of a coparcenary in the family.

The bench of Justice Vivek Jain passed the common order on April 30, 2026 in Misc. Petition No. 2688 of 2026 and Misc. Petition No. 2744 of 2026, dismissing both petitions and affirming the order of the lower appellate court dated April 2, 2026, which had partly vacated a temporary injunction originally granted by the trial court.

The factual background of the dispute involves a civil suit filed by the plaintiff, one of the children of the aged father, seeking partition of properties standing in the name of the father. The suit was instituted on the assertion that the father, though the recorded owner of the properties, held them as part of a coparcenary comprising himself and his children, having inherited them from his ancestors, and was therefore not entitled to deal with the properties in the manner he chose except in respect of his own share. The plaintiff contended that all the children have a birthright in the properties and that the father should be restrained from alienating them. The properties in dispute are situated in Survey Nos. 288/1, 71/1, 277/5 and 446.

The trial court had granted a temporary injunction covering all four properties, restraining the father from dealing with, constructing upon, or alienating any of them. The father, who is approximately 90 years of age, challenged this order in appeal. The lower appellate court, by its order dated April 2, 2026, partially modified the injunction. It vacated the injunction in respect of two properties bearing Survey Nos. 288/1 and 71/1, holding that these properties do not prima facie constitute coparcenary property, while retaining the injunction in respect of the remaining two properties. Both the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, one of the other siblings, challenged this partial modification before the High Court, being aggrieved by the appellate court’s order.

Before the High Court, counsel for the petitioners argued that by holding that the properties in Survey Nos. 288/1 and 71/1 are not prima facie coparcenary properties, the appellate court had effectively adjudicated the very subject matter of the suit at a preliminary and interlocutory stage, which it was not expected to do at such a stage. It was also urged that the grievance of the other family members is specifically against the father and one of the siblings, defendant No. 5, as the father is reportedly inclined to alienate the properties in favour of defendant No. 5, which ought not to be permitted.

The High Court, however, declined to interfere. It expressed full agreement with the reasoning of the lower appellate court that, given the father is approximately 90 years of age, no restraint should be lightly imposed on his right to enjoy his property.

The Court observed that to prevent a father from enjoying and dealing with property at the instance of his own children, a very strong prima facie case establishing the birthright and the existence of a coparcenary must be made out, and that children cannot come to court at the drop of a hat and obtain orders restraining their aged parents from alienating or enjoying their property. The Court further observed that permitting such actions casually would amount to a travesty of justice for senior citizens and a denial of their basic human rights in the evening of their lives, even where the property may have been inherited by them from their ancestors.

On the legal dimension, the High Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, which was relied upon by the lower appellate court in holding that after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the theory of birthright in property does not exist in the form in which it operated under the old Hindu law. The High Court affirmed this position, observing that with the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, succession of property in the case of a Hindu male dying intestate takes place in accordance with Section 8 of the Act read with its Schedule, and that there can be no inference of the existence of a coparcenary in respect of properties that devolved through such statutory succession after 1956.

On the specific properties, the Court noted that so far as Survey No. 288/1 is concerned, the father of defendant No. 1, that is, the paternal grandfather of the parties, had acquired the property in the year 1961, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, and therefore no inference of the existence of a coparcenary can be drawn in respect of that property. As regards Survey No. 71/1, the lower appellate court had found that no source of title of that land could be established so as to make even a prima facie case of the existence of a coparcenary, and the High Court concurred with that finding.

The High Court held that the plaintiffs are yet to prove the existence of a coparcenary, and that no such inference can be drawn merely on the basis of bare pleadings. Finding no error of reasoning or jurisdiction in the lower appellate court’s order, the High Court dismissed both petitions.

Case Title: Mukesh Kumar Kewat and Others v. Gaya Prasad Kewat and Others, Misc. Petition No. 2688 of 2026, and Jai Kumar Kewat v. Gaya Prasad Kewat and Others, Misc. Petition No. 2744 of 2026.

[Read Order]