Delhi HC Upholds Divorce On Cruelty Grounds, Denies Alimony To Financially Independent Wife [Read Judgment]

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has upheld a divorce decree granted on the ground of cruelty while denying permanent alimony to a financially self-sufficient wife, ruling that alimony is a measure of social justice and not a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar made these observations while dismissing an appeal filed by a Group ‘A’ officer of the Indian Railway Traffic Service, challenging a Family Court judgment dissolving her marriage.

The court addressed MAT.APP.(F.C.) 2/2024, filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, assailing the judgment dated August 31, 2023, passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, which dissolved the marriage on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

The marriage between the appellant-wife, an IRTS officer, and the respondent-husband, an advocate, was solemnized on January 25, 2010, in accordance with Hindu rites. This was a second marriage for both parties, who had been divorced from their respective earlier spouses. No children were born from this union, and the matrimonial cohabitation proved short-lived, with serious differences arising soon after the marriage. The respondent left the matrimonial home on March 8, 2011.

The respondent alleged that the appellant subjected him to cruelty throughout the marriage, habitually using profane and degrading language toward him and his family. He relied on text messages sent by the appellant between March and June 2011 containing grave imputations, including one dated June 27, 2011, reading: “Now I realise why you resemble jethu (uncle). Yr character speaks of yr illegitimate origin. Goodbye.”

The respondent also alleged an incident in January 2011 when the appellant slapped him for expressing his desire to accompany her on a trip, that she denied him conjugal relations, and that in early March 2011, she insisted that his parents vacate the matrimonial home.

The appellant denied the allegations and claimed she was subjected to cruelty by the respondent, who persistently pressured her to misuse her official position to secure his appointment as a panel lawyer. She alleged multiple instances of harassment, including being locked inside the matrimonial home on January 12, 2011, and being compelled to cook non-vegetarian food against her familial customs.

The appellant further alleged that the respondent and his mother subjected her to frivolous litigation, including a theft complaint dismissed at the pre-summoning stage, civil defamation suits dismissed for non-prosecution, and other criminal complaints. She claimed that continued cohabitation between 2011 and 2013 amounted to condonation of alleged cruelty.

The Family Court granted divorce to the respondent-husband, finding that the appellant used abusive language, called him a “bastard,” used filthy language against his mother, made his parents leave the house, and that her parents humiliated him. The court held that these acts constituted cruelty and that the marriage had irretrievably broken down after twelve years of separation.

On appeal, the appellant’s counsel argued that the Family Court failed to appreciate specific allegations of cruelty against the respondent, including the January 12, 2011, locking incident, demands for money by the respondent’s mother, and harassment through frivolous litigation. He contended that the court erroneously examined electronic evidence without a Section 65B certificate under the Evidence Act.

The respondent’s senior counsel highlighted that the appellant habitually used degrading epithets such as “janwar,” “son of a bitch,” “haramzada,” “kutta,” and “kamina,” and that her own evidence affidavit stated that a divorce decree could be granted subject to payment of ₹50 lakhs, demonstrating that her opposition was financially motivated rather than bona fide.

Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, writing for the bench, conducted an exhaustive analysis of jurisprudence on mental cruelty, citing Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511, which emphasized that mental cruelty must be judged based on cumulative conduct rather than isolated incidents, considering the parties’ social status, educational background, and attending circumstances.

The court found that the text messages proved beyond doubt contained “vile, derogatory, and scandalous language,” including terms like “bastard,” “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that the respondent’s mother should “earn through prostitution.” The court rejected the appellant’s explanation that the respondent must have sent the messages from her phone as “inherently improbable” and an “afterthought.”

Justice Shankar observed, “Words and communications of the sort proved in this case are not innocuous. The law recognizes that mental cruelty may be visited by persistent and deliberate verbal abuse and conduct that degrades a spouse and injures reputation and self-respect.”

The court noted that the Family Court’s findings were not based solely on the messages but also on contemporaneous incidents, including the January 2011 slapping incident, refusal of conjugal relations, forcing the respondent’s parents to vacate the matrimonial home, and abusive language in the presence of her father on March 8, 2011.

On condonation, the court held that the appellant failed to substantiate her claim of cohabitation between 2011 and 2013 with any material evidence. The court noted that even if cohabitation occurred, her subsequent conduct—including refusal to reconcile, persistent demands for money, and her express statement in 2019 that she would only accept divorce upon payment of ₹50 lakhs—demonstrated no intent to revive the marriage.

Regarding electronic evidence, the court noted that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act permits receiving as evidence any document that may assist in dealing effectually with a dispute, whether or not otherwise admissible under the Evidence Act. The court cited Aman Lohia v. Kiran Lohia (2021) 5 SCC 489, which clarified that Family Courts can receive documents to assist effective dispute resolution.

On permanent alimony, the court noted that during hearings, the appellant reiterated her need for “financial security” and demanded money as she was nearing retirement. Justice Shankar observed, “When a spouse, while ostensibly resisting the dissolution of marriage, simultaneously predicates consent thereto upon payment of a substantial sum, such conduct inevitably indicates that the resistance is not anchored in affection, reconciliation, or preservation of the marital bond, but in pecuniary considerations.”

The court examined principles under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, citing Parvin Kumar Jain v. Anju Jain (2025) 2 SCC 227, which laid down factors including the parties’ status, reasonable needs, qualifications, employment status, independent income, standard of living enjoyed, and financial capacity of the husband.

It further held, “It is a settled principle that permanent alimony is intended as a measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals. The law requires that the applicant demonstrate a genuine need for financial assistance.”

The court found that the appellant, being a Group ‘A’ IRTS officer with substantial salary, allowances, and service benefits, was fully capable of maintaining herself. There was no evidence of financial hardship, dependency, medical condition, or familial obligation necessitating support, and no substantial income disparity between the parties.

The court emphasized, “Judicial discretion under Section 25 cannot be exercised to award alimony where the applicant is financially self-sufficient and independent.” The short cohabitation duration, absence of children, substantial independent income, and lack of financial necessity collectively negated any claim for permanent alimony.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

[Read Judgment]