New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India has held that in criminal prosecutions under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the period of limitation commences from the date on which the identity of all the accused persons becomes known to the competent authority, and not from the date on which the initial complaint was first received.
The Court further held that compliance with Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is not a mandatory requirement when the complaint has been filed by a public servant acting in discharge of official duty.
The matter arose from a complaint lodged in 2006 by Mr. Joy Mandi, who alleged a serious discrepancy in the labelling of a vaccine purchased for the immunisation of his child. The outer carton of the drug was labelled as “Easy Five Pentavalent Vaccine,” which purportedly contained five different vaccines, including a vaccine for Hepatitis B (HBsAg 10 mcg).
However, the label on the inner vial identified the product as “Easy Four Tetravalent Vaccine,” which contained only four vaccines and did not include the Hepatitis B component. The drug in question was manufactured by M/s. Panacea Biotec Ltd., a Delhi-based pharmaceutical company.
Following receipt of the complaint on 05.01.2006, the Drugs Inspector (Intelligence Branch), Office of the Assistant Drugs Controller, Thrissur, Kerala, initiated an inquiry. The inquiry involved inspection of the premises of the medical agencies involved in the purchase and sale of the drug, seizure of invoices and credit notes, and recording of statements. It was only on 18.04.2006 that the identity of all the accused persons became known to the competent authority. The formal complaint was thereafter filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Thrissur, on 20.01.2009.
The CJM summoned the accused and subsequently condoned the delay in filing the complaint under Section 473 of the CrPC. The respondents, aggrieved by the summoning order, approached the Kerala High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking to quash the proceedings. The High Court, vide its order dated 14.07.2022, quashed the complaint on the ground that the CJM had failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC before issuing process against the accused, who resided beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
The Supreme Court was called upon to examine two questions: first, whether the complaint filed on 20.01.2009 was barred by limitation under Sections 468 and 469 of the CrPC; and second, whether compliance with Section 202(1) of the CrPC was mandatory even when the complainant was a public servant acting in discharge of official duty.
On the question of limitation, the bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti held that the relevant provision to be applied was Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC, which provides that the limitation period commences from the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer making the investigation. The Court observed that though the initial complaint was made by Mr. Joy Mandi on 05.01.2006, the identity of all the accused persons was established only on 18.04.2006 upon completion of the verification process. Accordingly, the three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) of the CrPC would expire only on 17.04.2009. Since the formal complaint was filed on 20.01.2009 and cognizance was taken and summons were issued on 29.01.2009, the proceedings were well within the limitation period.
On the question of territorial jurisdiction and compliance with Section 202 of the CrPC, the Court drew upon its earlier decision in Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, wherein it was held that the Legislature had placed public servants on a different footing when they file complaints in discharge of official duties. The Court noted that the proviso to Section 200 of the CrPC expressly exempts a Magistrate from examining the complainant on oath when the complaint has been filed by a public servant acting in official capacity. Reading Sections 200 and 202 together and harmoniously, the Court concluded that the mandatory inquiry contemplated under Section 202(1) loses its rigidity when the complainant is a public servant discharging official duties. The Court also noted that one of the accused who had actually sold the medicine to the original complainant resided within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned, adding further context to the jurisdictional question.
The Supreme Court consequently set aside the High Court’s impugned order, restored the summoning order dated 10.07.2012, and directed fresh summons to be issued. It also directed that persons in charge of running the affairs of the accused companies at the relevant time be arrayed as accused, given that the original Managing Director had since passed away.
In a connected appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 8867 of 2023, the Court additionally held that the High Court’s finding regarding non-compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was premature, as the question of whether the Directors were “in charge of” and “responsible to the company for its business” is a question of fact to be determined by the Trial Court at the appropriate stage.
Case Title: The State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s. Panacea Biotec Ltd. & Anr. [Criminal Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4524 of 2023]
