New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that the substantive legal standards governing discharge and framing of charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, continue unchanged under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), while observing that the new legislation introduces regulatory discipline through express timelines and procedural structuring, without transforming the judicial task itself.
A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh passed the judgment while allowing an appeal filed by Dr. Anand Rai, challenging his prosecution under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, along with various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The case arose from an FIR registered on November 15, 2022, at PS Bilpank, District Ratlam, alleging that members of the JAYS organization, including the appellant, had intercepted vehicles of Members of Parliament and Members of the Legislative Assembly arriving at an event for the unveiling of a statue of Bhagwan Birsa Munda. The prosecution alleged that the accused created a disturbance, pelted stones, and assaulted security personnel, causing injuries.
The Trial Court had partially allowed the appellant’s discharge application, discharging him from charges under Sections 294 and 506 IPC read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, but framed charges under Sections 147, 341, 427, 353, 332, 333, 326, 323, 352 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissed the appeal against this order.
Addressing the continuity of legal principles, the Supreme Court observed that, on a close reading of the statutory text of the CrPC and the BNSS, the position is one of continuity rather than change in relation to the Court’s power at the stages of discharge and framing of charges.
The Court noted:
“In both enactments, the governing standards are framed in materially the same language. At the stage of discharge, the Court is required to consider whether there is any sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused in Sessions cases, or whether the charge is groundless in Magistrate warrant cases. At the subsequent stage, charges are to be framed only if the Court forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.”
The Court clarified that these formulations, which have long anchored the exercise of judicial discretion under the CrPC, are carried forward in substance in the corresponding provisions of the BNSS, without any textual indication that the level of scrutiny is intended to be either heightened or diluted.
However, the Court explained that what the BNSS does is change the procedural setting within which this discretion is exercised. The new statute introduces express timelines for filing discharge applications and for framing charges, and expressly recognizes the possibility of the accused being heard or examined through electronic means.
The Court held:
“These changes are regulatory in nature. They are aimed at structuring the process and reducing delay, not at transforming the judicial task itself. The Court’s obligation to apply its mind to the record, to hear both sides, and to record reasons where discharge is ordered remains exactly as before, as does the caution against weighing evidence or conducting a mini trial at these preliminary stages.”
The Court concluded that the established jurisprudence developed under the CrPC on the scope and limits of consideration at the stages of discharge and framing of charges continues to hold the field under the BNSS, with the statutory language supporting the conclusion that the Legislature has retained the same substantive balance while seeking to impose greater procedural discipline and expedition.
Turning to the substantive issue, the Court examined the essential ingredients required for charges under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. For Section 3(2)(v), the Court noted that the accused must first commit an offence under the IPC punishable with ten or more years of imprisonment, directed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or their property, with knowledge that the victim belongs to SC/ST or that the property belongs to such person.
For Section 3(2)(va), the Court observed that the accused must commit one of the scheduled offences against an SC/ST member or their property, with knowledge of the caste identity of the victim or that the property belongs to them.
The Court noted a critical contradiction in the Trial Court’s reasoning. While the Trial Court itself had recorded in Part C of its judgment that “none of the witnesses have specifically stated as to which of the accused persons used casteist slurs to insult, abuse and threaten to kill,” it nevertheless proceeded to frame charges under the SC/ST Act.
The Court observed:
“We are at a loss to understand that when the Trial Court itself acknowledges that none of the statements under Section 161 CrPC state the specific slurs uttered by the accused with the intent to insult, threaten, or kill, then how is it found, on the same bundle of evidence and with the same level of scrutiny thereof, that the alleged acts of the accused were informed by caste awareness.”
The Court held that there did not appear to be any other material on record to establish knowledge on the part of the accused, and once knowledge is in question, the charge cannot stand. The Court also observed that there was no averment whatsoever that the complainant was a member of the SC/ST community.
The Court further criticized the High Court for failing to discharge its duty as a first appellate court. Despite the impugned judgment running into eighteen pages, the Court noted that it did not deal at all with the charge under the SC/ST Act, merely stating that the Trial Court had “assigned elaborate reasons.”
The Court emphasized that an appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law. Relying on Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1996) 4 SCC 720] and Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC 415], the Court reiterated that a first appellate court must independently evaluate the material on record and cannot dispose of an appeal in a cursory manner.
The Court held:
“The High Court does not function as a revisional or supervisory court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 14-A but assumes the role of a first appellate court. A mechanical affirmation of the order of the Special Court, without independent scrutiny, would therefore be inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence and would amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”
However, the Court also clarified that when dealing with threshold orders like discharge or framing of charges, the appellate court must remain conscious of the stage of proceedings and cannot adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact, assess witness reliability, or compare prosecution and defence versions, as that would collapse the distinction between trial and threshold scrutiny.
In a significant portion of the judgment, the Court elaborated on the constitutional foundations and social objectives of the SC/ST Act. The Court observed that while the Constitution guarantees equality, freedom from discrimination, and the right to live with dignity, these ideals often remained abstract for SC and ST communities because of centuries of social exclusion, oppression, and violence.
The Court held that the Act embodies the principle of equality before the law under Article 14, goes beyond formal equality by acknowledging unique social vulnerabilities, reinforces Article 17’s abolition of untouchability, embodies Article 15’s prohibition against discrimination, safeguards Article 21’s right to life and dignity, and advances the goals of social justice under Articles 38 and 46.
The Court described the Act as
“a transformative instrument, bridging the gap between constitutional ideals and everyday realities, ensuring that SC/ST citizens can live as equal, dignified, and empowered members of society.”
In its concluding observations, the Court emphasized the human dimension of judicial responsibility at the threshold stage. The Court observed:
“The power to frame a charge is not meant to be exercised by default or out of caution alone. When the material placed before the Court, taken at face value, does not disclose the ingredients of an offence, the law expects the Court to have the clarity and courage to say so.”
The Court held that discharge is not a technical indulgence but an essential safeguard, and to allow a matter to proceed despite the absence of a prima facie case is to expose a person to strain, stigma, and uncertainty without legal necessity.
“Fidelity to the rule of law requires the Court to remember that the process itself can become the punishment if this responsibility is not exercised with care.”
The Court specially addressed Trial Courts, noting:
“For a litigant or an accused, the Trial Court is not just one level in a hierarchy. It represents the face of the judiciary itself. The sensitivity, fairness, and legal discipline shown at this stage shape how ordinary citizens understand justice.”
The Supreme Court therefore quashed the charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant and remitted the matter to the Trial Court to proceed with the other charges in accordance with law, clarifying that no part of its consideration should be construed as a comment on charges other than those under the SC/ST Act.
Case Title: Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10711 of 2025; 2026 INSC 141)
