New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India has delivered a landmark judgment settling the law on the jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunals, holding that Tribunals constituted under the Wakf Act, 1995 have jurisdiction only over properties notified in the “list of auqaf” or registered under the Act, and not over disputes concerning unregistered properties, thereby resolving divergent opinions expressed by coordinate Benches.
A Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran addressed a Civil Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2937 of 2022, filed by Habib Alladin & Ors. against Mohammed Ahmed, dealing with the fundamental question concerning the reach and sweep of the jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunals.
The Court noted the complex legal landscape, stating:
“The neat question arising in the above appeal as to the reach and sweep of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Wakf Act, 1995, though short, has been rendered complex by divergent opinions expressed by coordinate Benches of this Court.”
The Court noted the appellants’ challenge, stating:
“The appellants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, specifically contending that there is no such mosque established or continued in the residential complex and, in any event, it is not a waqf under the Act of 1995; inclusion in the list notified or registration by the Waqf Board under that Act being mandatory for the plaintiff to approach the Tribunal.”
The Court began its legal analysis by examining the seminal decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726, noting that subsequent decisions had taken divergent approaches. The Court observed:
“Anis Fatma Begum, Pritpal Singh, P.V. Ibrahim Haji and Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf distinguished the decision in Ramesh Gobindram, while Haryana Wakf Board v. Mahesh Kumar, Bhanwar Lal v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf and Punjab Wakf Board v. Sham Singh Harike followed Ramesh Gobindram.”
The Court emphasized the principle governing coordinate Bench decisions, stating:
“This would not accord with the principles laid down in the decision of the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi.”
Addressing the impact of the 2013 amendment, the Court held:
“The larger principle of the ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts being confined to the precise power conferred under the statute, according to us, survives the amendment and is not extinguished by reason of the particular amendment.”
The Court articulated the surviving principle, stating:
“The Tribunal is only clothed with the powers under Sections 6 and 7 to resolve disputes and questions arising with respect to whether a property is wakf property or not; this power survives the amendment, as confined to those properties included in the ‘list of auqaf’, defined in Section 2(g).”
The Court extracted key principles from Ramesh Gobindram, emphasizing that the ouster of civil court jurisdiction is limited. The Court stated:
“Section 85 of the Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain any suit or proceedings in relation to orders passed by or proceedings that may be commenced before the Tribunal. It follows that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts even under Section 85 is not absolute.”
On the interpretation of Section 83, the Court quoted Ramesh Gobindram:
“There is, in our view, nothing in Section 83 to suggest that it pushes the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts beyond what has been provided for in Section 6(5), Section 7 and Section 85 of the Act.”
Regarding the procedural nature of amendments, the Court held:
“The amendment in 2013 providing an expanded definition of ‘list of auqaf’ was procedural in nature, since it merely enabled disputes with respect to whether a property entered in the register maintained under Section 37 is a waqf property or not, also to be resolved by the Waqf Tribunal.”
The Court found the amendment to be clarificatory, stating:
“The legislative measure of substitution having been employed in the amendment of Section 3(g), we are of the opinion that it was clarificatory in nature and applies to the Act from its inception.”
The Court critically analysed the divergent view in Anis Fatma Begum, stating:
“Anis Fatma Begum was in clear conflict with the interpretation of Section 83 in Ramesh Gobindram. It was diametrically opposite to the conclusion in Ramesh Gobindram that a plain reading of Section 83 does not suggest that it pushes the jurisdiction of the civil court beyond what has been provided in Section 6(1) & (5), Section 7 and Section 85 of the Act.”
The Court addressed the procedural lapse, stating:
“As held in Pranay Sethi, if a divergent view had to be taken, the Coordinate Bench in Anis Fatma Begum ought to have referred the matter to a Larger Bench, following which the dictum in the earlier Division Bench survives.”
On the scope of Section 83, the Court emphasized:
“We cannot find Section 83 to be a provision conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal with respect to matters in addition to those for which jurisdiction has already been conferred under the other provisions of the Act.”
The Court critically examined Section 83 before and after the amendment, noting that decisions
“specifically dealing with Section 83(1) extracted only the words ‘for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property’ and omitted the words ‘under this Act’.”
Emphasizing the significance of the phrase “under this Act”, the Court stated:
“The wakf or wakf properties should thus have a status under the Act, which is possible only by inclusion in the ‘list of auqaf’, which now includes a list published after a survey under Chapter II or a registration made under Chapter V.”
The Court articulated the fundamental principle, stating:
“Section 83 does not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal for an omnibus consideration of any dispute, question or other matter related to a wakf or wakf property. It merely enables the constitution of the Tribunal, and the mere recital of what the Tribunal could do is not an expansive conferment of power.”
On the limited ouster of civil court jurisdiction, the Court emphasized:
“There is no absolute and all-pervasive ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court even under Section 85 of the Act of 1995.”
The Court stated the jurisdictional requirement clearly:
“The resolution of disputes with respect to a property being a waqf or not is expressly conferred on the Tribunal only with respect to those properties specified in the ‘list of auqaf’. This is the statutory imprimatur which cannot be deviated from by courts of law.”
In its definitive holding, the Court stated:
“We hence respectfully affirm the principle of jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal under the Wakf Act, 1995 and the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 85 of the said Act to be as considered and declared in Ramesh Gobindram.”
Clarifying the limited impact of the 2013 amendment, the Court stated:
“The Amendment Act of 2013 removes the substratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram only to the extent of the absence found of jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal to remove encroachers, and does not, in any other manner, interfere with the principle stated regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
Applying the law to the facts, the Court held:
“A bare reading of the plaint would indicate that the property is neither specified in the ‘list of auqaf’ as published under Chapter II nor registered under Chapter V, and hence the decision as to whether the property is a waqf property or not cannot be decided by the Tribunal.”
In its final directive, the Court stated:
“The appeal is allowed, rejecting the suit filed before the Tribunal, leaving the question of whether the scheduled property is a waqf or not open to be agitated in accordance with law.”
Case Title: Habib Alladin & Ors. v. Mohammed Ahmed
