Spouse May Claim Damages for Marital Interference by Third Party: Delhi HC [Read Order]

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has broken new legal ground by ruling that a spouse can maintain a civil suit seeking damages against a third party for intentionally interfering with their marriage, recognizing the tort of “Alienation of Affection” as maintainable under Indian law despite its absence from statutory provisions.

Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav delivered the landmark judgment on September 15, 2025, in CS(OS) 602/2025 (Shelly Mahajan vs. Ms. Bhanushree Bahl & Anr.), allowing summons to be issued in what is among the first reported Indian civil cases to formally proceed on allegations of alienation of affection.

The case involves Shelly Mahajan, who married her husband in March 2012 and had twin children in 2018. She alleges that Bhanushree Bahl, who joined her husband’s business venture as an analyst in 2021, knowingly developed an intimate relationship with her married husband, causing the breakdown of their marriage.

According to the plaintiff’s allegations, the relationship became apparent in March 2023 when she overheard intimate conversations and discovered letters confirming the extramarital affair. Despite family intervention, the third party allegedly refused to end the relationship, leading to public humiliation and the husband filing for divorce in April 2025.

The defendants raised several jurisdictional challenges, arguing that the matter fell within the exclusive domain of Family Courts under the Family Courts Act, 1984, and that parallel matrimonial proceedings barred the civil suit. They also contended that individuals enjoy personal autonomy in their relationships and that no legal duty exists to refrain from such interactions.

Justice Kaurav, however, conducted an extensive analysis of the concept of alienation of affection, noting that while Indian legislation does not expressly recognize this tort, it has been acknowledged in principle by the Supreme Court. The court traced the evolution of “heart-balm” torts from Anglo-American common law, which historically included alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of promise to marry.

The judgment referenced the Supreme Court’s observations in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, where the apex court noted that “alienation of affection by a stranger, if proved, is an intentional tort i.e. interference in the marital relationship with intent to alienate one spouse from the other.” The court emphasized that such actions require “clear evidence of active and wrongful interference, with acts that are intentional and calculated to entice one spouse away from the other.”

Justice Kaurav therefore noted the strict evidentiary standards required: “Mere association or acquaintance with a spouse is insufficient. There must be clear evidence of active and wrongful interference, with acts that are intentional and calculated to entice one spouse away from the other.”

The court also cited Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, where the Supreme Court observed that a woman knowingly entering into a relationship with a married man “may amount to an intentional tort, namely, interference with the marital relationship by alienating the husband from his legally wedded wife and children.”

Addressing jurisdictional concerns, Justice Kaurav distinguished the case from Family Court matters by applying the “cause of action test” established in Geeta Anand v. Tanya Arjun. The court found that the alleged tortious interference by the third party constitutes “an actionable civil injury arising from independent tortious conduct” rather than a dispute intrinsically linked to the marital relationship.

“The wrong alleged here, i.e., the intentional and wrongful interference by defendant no.1 resulting in the loss of consortium and companionship of defendant no.2, is pleaded not as an incidental outcome of marriage, but as an actionable civil injury arising from independent tortious conduct,” the court observed.

The court also extensively analyzed the concept using Hohfeld’s analytical framework, concluding that if a spouse possesses “a protectable interest in marital consortium, intimacy, and companionship, the correlative legal duty would be that any third party must not intentionally and wrongfully interfere with that relationship.”

However, the court acknowledged that personal autonomy remains paramount: “Where the conduct of a spouse is completely voluntary, not induced and uncoerced, that exercise of such liberty of one spouse will defeat third-party liability.”

Justice Kaurav addressed the defendants’ arguments about personal freedom, noting that while Joseph Shine v. Union of India decriminalized adultery, it “did not create a license to enter into intimate relationships beyond marriage, free from civil or legal implications.” The court emphasized that marriage carries expectations of exclusivity, and voluntary sexual intercourse with someone outside marriage constitutes valid grounds for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The court also referred to international contexts, noting that alienation of affection survives in only a handful of U.S. jurisdictions (Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah) and has been abolished in England, Wales, and Canada. However, the court emphasized that English common law principles continue to apply in India, where consistent with the constitutional framework.

For a successful alienation of affection claim, the court established that plaintiffs must prove: “(i) intentional and wrongful conduct by the defendant directed at alienating the marital relationship of the plaintiff, (ii) clear causation linking that conduct to a legally cognisable injury to the plaintiff, and (iii) that the loss claimed is susceptible of rational assessment.”

The court, however, made it clear that “The observations herein are confined solely to examining the maintainability of the suit at the stage of issuing summons, without expressing any opinion on the merits.”

Justice Kaurav also noted the absence of any reported Indian civil case where damages were actually awarded for alienation of affection, stating that “while Indian jurisprudence has acknowledged the concept in principle as a possible tort, and the action by the aggrieved spouse to be maintainable, the Courts have, thus far, not evolved any substantive law or remedies to support its enforcement in practice.”

The court reserved liberty for defendants to challenge the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code at the appropriate stage, while directing written statements to be filed within thirty days.

Ms. Malavika Rajkotia, Ms. Purva Dua, and Mr. Mayank Grover, Advocates, represented the plaintiff, while Mr. K.C. Jain, Advocate, appeared for the first defendant, and Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, Ms. Tulika Bhatnagar, and Mr. Sehaj Kataria, Advocates, represented the second defendant.

Case Title: Shelly Mahajan vs. Ms. Bhanushree Bahl & Anr.

[Read Order]