Calcutta HC Dismisses PIL Challenging ECI’s Mass Transfer of Officers in West Bengal [Read Judgment]

Kolkata: The Calcutta High Court has dismissed a Public Interest Litigation filed by Advocate Arka Kumar Nag. The petition challenged the Election Commission of India’s large-scale transfer of officers following the West Bengal election announcement on March 15, 2026.

A Division Bench of Chief Justice Sujoy Paul and Justice Partha Sarathi Sen held that the PIL was fundamentally flawed. The petitioner had himself admitted in the petition that the ECI holds the power to transfer officers. Since the existence of that power was never disputed, the court declined to examine its exercise further.

On March 15, 2026, the ECI issued a notification declaring elections in five States. Shortly thereafter, it transferred the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Director General of Police, several District Magistrates, Superintendents of Police, and Principal Secretaries of development departments in West Bengal.

In total, 63 police officers and 16 IAS officers were transferred. A sizable number of subordinate officers were also subsequently shifted. Sixteen officers were sent out of West Bengal entirely.

Senior Counsel Shri Kalyan Bandopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the transfers amounted to an imposition akin to President’s Rule under Article 356. He submitted that while Article 324 grants the ECI the power to conduct free and fair elections, it does not confer unfettered authority.

The petitioner contended that the mass transfer of officers disturbs the federal structure and interferes with the functioning of an elected government. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench judgment in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, which holds that the ECI must act within the bounds of parliamentary law.

It was also argued that during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process, the ECI had not invoked Article 324 or transferred officers. There was, therefore, no justification to do so after the election process began. Reliance was placed on Sections 13CC, 20A, 20B, and 28A of the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951 to argue that transfers can only take place in consonance with statutory provisions.

The petitioner further pointed out an internal inconsistency in the ECI’s stand. While the transfer orders directed that officers posted elsewhere should not be engaged in election duties, one of them, Shri Jagdish Prasad, was transferred to Tamil Nadu specifically as an observer for elections there.

The Advocate General, Shri Kishore Datta, supported the petitioner. He submitted that the ECI’s action was designed to ‘numb’ the State Government for the benefit of the party in power at the Centre. He placed heavy reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, to submit that any member of the public acting bona fide can maintain a PIL in matters of public interest.

He also relied on Article 324(6) to argue that staff can only be provided to the ECI upon the recommendation of the State Cabinet under Article 163. He urged that the Chief Secretary is a constitutionally significant post and could not have been shifted arbitrarily.

Senior Counsel Shri D.S. Naidu, appearing for the ECI, argued that the petitioner, a government pleader for the State of West Bengal, had suppressed a material fact about his professional identity. He submitted that the petition was not filed in public interest but to canvass political interest.

He pointed out that confidential internal documents between the ECI and the State Government had been filed by the petitioner, raising questions about how he obtained them. He further submitted that allegations of connivance were made against senior politicians, but none of them were impleaded by name.

On the merits, Shri Naidu placed the ECI’s press note dated March 17, 2026 before the court. It showed that, as of that date, 40 IAS officers had been deployed in Jharkhand, 49 in Madhya Pradesh, 23 in West Bengal, 25 in Tamil Nadu, and 16 in Kerala. The exercise was nationwide and not directed against West Bengal alone.

He further submitted that the officers who replaced the transferred officials were more senior. The new Chief Secretary is one year senior to the outgoing Chief Secretary, and the new Home Secretary is seven years senior to the outgoing one. There was, therefore, no administrative vacuum.

Reliance was placed on Division Bench judgments of the Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Allahabad High Courts, all of which had held that the ECI is not obliged to assign reasons for transferring officers during elections. It was also noted that a similar challenge before the Supreme Court in Ravi Bhusan v. Election Commission of India, WP(C) 697 of 2015, was withdrawn after the court declined to interfere.

The court began its analysis by examining paragraph 28 of the writ petition itself. In that paragraph, the petitioner had expressly stated that the ECI holds the power to transfer officers, but that the power must be exercised with caution and responsibility. It must not be used indiscriminately or as a matter of routine.

The court held that this pleading amounted to a clear admission that the ECI’s power to transfer officers is not in dispute. Since the petitioner had acknowledged the existence of the power in his own petition, it was not open to him or to the State Government, in its supporting capacity, to argue beyond those pleadings.

The court observed that a petitioner cannot argue beyond the scope of his pleadings. The State Government’s support for the petitioner could not expand the case beyond what had been pleaded. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639.

On the question of administrative paralysis, the court found no merit in the argument that the State had been ‘numbed’. It noted that each transferred officer had been replaced, and the replacements were more senior. No actual vacuum had been created.

The court also referred to the Karnataka High Court’s judgment in ECI v. State of Karnataka, where it was held that the ECI is under no obligation to give reasons for transferring officers during elections. Such transfers must be understood in the context of ensuring free and fair elections.

On the maintainability of the PIL, the court applied the framework laid down in S.P. Gupta (supra). A PIL can only be maintained if the action complained of causes injury to public interest at large. The petitioner, being a practising advocate, could not have a personal grievance against the transfers. More importantly, he failed to establish with any precision that the transfer of officers would lead to administrative collapse or deprive the public of the benefits of government schemes.

The court also declined to entertain the allegations of malice and political nexus against the ECI, since the persons alleged to have exerted influence were not impleaded by name. No material beyond bald pleadings was placed to support such allegations.

Regarding the argument based on provisions of the RP Acts of 1950 and 1951, the court noted that the petitioner, a legally trained person, had not pleaded any specific breach of any Central or State legislation. In the absence of such pleading, there was no occasion for the court to undertake any academic exercise on the statutory limits of the ECI’s power.

The court held that the petitioner had failed to establish the elementary ingredient required to maintain a PIL—that public injury had been caused by the transfers. The PIL was accordingly dismissed. No costs were awarded.

The court clarified that the judgment would not prevent aggrieved officers from individually challenging their transfer orders before appropriate forums in accordance with law.

Case Title: Arka Kumar Nag v. Election Commission of India and others, WPA (P) 141 of 2026

[Read Judgment]