Madurai: The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has dismissed a husband's appeal seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. It held that the inability of spouses to have a child cannot be converted into a matrimonial fault of the wife. The court observed that a wife who repeatedly undergoes painful fertility treatment and expresses willingness to resume married life cannot be portrayed as having abandoned the marriage or as having treated her husband with cruelty.
A Division Bench of Justice G.R. Swaminathan and Justice M.D. Sumathi was hearing a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. The husband challenged the Family Court, Theni's judgment and decree dated 01.03.2022, which dismissed his petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The marriage was solemnised on 18.06.2007. The husband claimed that after about six months of peace, the wife subjected him to mental cruelty. He alleged that she considered herself and her family superior, made disparaging remarks, unnecessarily suspected him whenever he returned late from work, and was influenced by her mother. He said she had told him she married him only under family pressure. He also alleged that she repeatedly left the matrimonial home and refused to cooperate in marital life for about four years. His principal allegation was an incident of 04.06.2016, in which, he said, she abused him in public, called him impotent and assaulted him with footwear and a broom, after which she left with her jewels.
The wife denied the allegations. She said her objection to his late return was due to his drinking and the danger of riding a two-wheeler after consuming alcohol. She stated that she had undergone surgery for fibroid growth in the hope of establishing a normal family life, and that her visits to her sister's home were at the husband's own instance when he travelled for work. She contended that the allegations were made only to obtain a divorce.
The Family Court had found no independent corroboration of the allegations. It noted that the husband's own father did not speak about the alleged incidents and that neither party had lodged a police complaint. It also held that merely questioning a husband about late arrival is not cruelty, and that there was no sufficient medical evidence of the wife being permanently incapable of bearing a child.
Before the High Court, the husband argued that cruelty ordinarily occurs within the four walls of the home and cannot always be proved by independent witnesses. He also argued that the Family Court looked at the allegations in isolation and ignored their cumulative effect and the prolonged separation. The wife supported the Family Court's judgment.
The Bench held that the burden of proving cruelty lies on the spouse alleging it. It noted that cruelty must be assessed by looking at the entire relationship, but said this cannot mean that unproved allegations, when accumulated, automatically become proved cruelty. Relying on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, it said the foundational facts constituting the conduct must themselves be established. It found no perversity in the Family Court's appreciation of evidence and held that the incidents being alleged to have occurred at home does not relieve the husband of the burden of proving them. On the 04.06.2016 incident, the court said the seriousness of an allegation cannot substitute proof.
The court devoted much of its reasoning to childlessness. It observed that fertility treatment involves repeated hormonal injections, scans, blood tests and invasive procedures, with considerable emotional strain. It held that the wife's willingness to undergo such treatment is inconsistent with an intention to avoid matrimonial life and cannot be treated as cruelty. The Bench said that marriage cannot be reduced to the sole object of procreation, and that a spouse cannot be treated as having failed merely because the couple has no child. It also cautioned courts to examine whether a medical condition has been improperly converted into an allegation of cruelty against the wife.
On the husband's reliance on prolonged separation, the court held that long separation is relevant but cannot be mechanically converted into a ground of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia). It noted that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not, by itself, a statutory ground under that provision. The court observed that the wife consistently expressed willingness to reunite, including during interaction before the court, and that the husband himself pleaded attempts at reunion. It distinguished cases where both spouses have unequivocally shown the marriage is dead.
Dismissing the appeal, the Bench confirmed the Family Court's judgment and decree and made no order as to costs.
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Mr. R. Murali, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mrs. S. Vaidurya, Advocate.
Case Title: Husband vs. Wife, CMA(MD) No. 724 of 2022 [2026:MHC:4039]
