New Delhi: The Supreme Court has discharged a man of offences under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that a long-standing consensual relationship that later turned acrimonious cannot be converted into rape, and that sexual acts during its subsistence cannot be “retrospectively branded” as rape.
A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan allowed the appeals of Santhosh Kumar N.P. against the Kerala High Court’s order of 21.05.2025, which had upheld the Sessions Court’s refusal to discharge him in S.C. No. 371/2013.
The complainant, a divorcee, alleged that the appellant represented himself as a bachelor and married her at a temple in Mysuru in 1996, that they lived together as a couple until 2003, and that she consented to sexual relations on the belief of a valid marriage. After a domestic violence complaint of 2008 was dismissed in 2009, she filed a private complaint, which was dismissed for non-prosecution in 2011, followed by a second complaint referred to the Kadirur Police under Section 156(3) CrPC, on which the FIR was registered. The appellant had disclosed in the DV proceedings that he was already married with two children.
Senior Advocate R. Basant, for the appellant, submitted that the complainant was mature, that she had herself stated in the DV proceedings that the appellant’s brother told her within nine months that he was already married, and that she nonetheless continued to cohabit with him. It was also argued that she could not identify the temple, and that no witness proved the marriage. The complainant, through AOR K. Rajeev, relied on a joint savings account, an IVF record signed by the appellant as “husband” and a lease agreement for the Mysuru house, and said that the appellant had assured her that his brother was lying.
The Court first reiterated the discharge standard under Section 227 CrPC from Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI. The Judge may sift and weigh the evidence only to see whether a prima facie case exists, but cannot defer to the prosecution’s version, and must consider the probability of the offence being committed, which is a lower standard than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
On Section 376(2)(n), the Court said “repeatedly” denotes separate acts at different times, usually an initial assault followed by acts under threat, pressure, captivity or continued deceit. Here the complainant, by her own account, learnt of the earlier marriage within months and still stayed for seven years. The Court found it “untenable and incredulous” that she kept believing herself the legal wife on the appellant’s oral assurance. It termed the case one of a consensual relationship “that perhaps was camouflaged in a marriage for the sake of avoiding scrutiny or stigma”.
“Physical intimacy that occurred during the currency of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as acts of rape merely because the relationship soured and no longer subsists.”
The Bench noted a “worrying trend” of ended consensual relationships being combed for post-facto allegations of sexual assault and distinguished absence of consent built on deceit from regret at past consent after a relationship fails. It added a caution that rape remains underreported, genuine cases must be pursued with vigour, and the legislature never intended consensual acts between adults to be retrospectively criminalised.
On Section 420, it found nothing to show that any property was delivered or any valuable security made, altered or destroyed because of the alleged deceit. On Sections 493, 494 and 495, it held that continued cohabitation after knowledge of the earlier marriage ruled out any belief in lawful wedlock. The complainant could not recall the temple, the priest’s statement gave no detail of the rites required for a valid Hindu marriage, and the IVF papers and joint accounts only indicated a long-standing personal relationship, not a marriage. The ingredients of Sections 494 and 495 were likewise not made out, as no valid marriage was prima facie shown.
The Court acknowledged that consent may stand vitiated where a woman is genuinely kept in the dark about the man’s earlier marriage, but said that must be decided on facts and evidence “and not by mere allegations or moral presumptions”. It added that criminal law cannot be used “as munitions to settle personal scores, exact revenge or coerce an individual”.
Holding that none of the offences was probable on the undisputed facts, the Court set aside the High Court and Trial Court orders and discharged the appellant.
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Mr. R. Basant, Senior Counsel.
For Respondent No. 2: Mr. K. Rajeev, Advocate-on-Record.
Case Title: Santhosh Kumar N.P. vs. State-Station House Officer, Kadirur Police & Anr., Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10173-10174 of 2025, 2026 INSC 1179
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