Continuous Residence and Bona Fide Livelihood Dependence on the Forest Are Essential Conditions to Claim Rights Under Forest Rights Act, 2006: Madras HC [Read Judgment]

Chennai: The Madras High Court has held that to qualify as an “Other Traditional Forest Dweller” under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, a claimant must establish that they were primarily residing in the forest land and solely dependent on it for their livelihood for at least three generations prior to December 13, 2005.

The Court held that merely cultivating a portion of reserved forest land while residing elsewhere is insufficient to claim the protection of the Act. The Court also clarified that the spirit of the legislation is to protect those whose very survival depends on the forest, and not to extend its benefits to persons who have no such dependence.

A division bench of Justice S.M. Subramaniam and Justice K. Surender dismissed a writ appeal filed by a group of 21 persons challenging the rejection of their claim to forest rights over 291.60 acres of reserved forest land at Suriyur Village, Salem District, Tamil Nadu. The judgment was delivered on March 10, 2026.

The appellants had applied under the Act, 2006, before the District Collector, Salem, seeking a declaration of their rights to possess reserved forest land. Their case was that their ancestors had been in possession and cultivation of land in S.No. 1905, situated at Suriyur Village, Kuralnatham Panchayat, Panamarathupatti Union, Salem District, for more than 75 years. They further contended that during the construction of the Panamarathupatti Lake and reservoir, large portions of their lands were acquired, and that despite this, they continued cultivation activities on the subject land. On this basis, they claimed to be entitled to a declaration of forest rights and a grant of patta over the 291.60 acres.

The District Collector, Salem, rejected the application by order dated February 8, 2021, finding that the appellants had not produced any document before the District Level Committee to establish possession and enjoyment of the land for 75 years as required under the Act. Their consequential prayer for grant of patta was also rejected at the District Level Review Meeting. The appellants then filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court challenging this rejection, which was dismissed by the single judge on March 10, 2023. The present writ appeal before the division bench arose out of that dismissal.

Before the division bench, the appellants’ counsel argued that the Act applies not only to Scheduled Tribes but also to “Other Traditional Forest Dwellers” as defined under Section 2(o), and that the appellants fell squarely within that definition. It was submitted that documents had been produced before the District Collector to establish that the ancestors of the appellants had been residing and cultivating the subject land for more than 75 years, and that the appellants themselves were continuing cultivation activities. On this basis, it was contended that the order of the District Collector was perverse and liable to be set aside.

The State opposed the appeal, contending that the appellants had produced no evidence of cultivating and primarily residing in the forest land for more than 75 years. It was submitted that the appellants were not Scheduled Tribe members, were not local residents of the forest area, and had Aadhaar cards registered at addresses outside the reserve forest. It was further pointed out that the Jarugumalai Forest Block had been notified as Reserved Forest as far back as March 15, 1926, and the Jalluthu Forest Block from September 15, 1989.

The Forest Department had, in fact, filed cases against the appellants for trespass into reserved forest land of Shervaroys South Range, and the encroachers had been fined. An eviction notice was issued on June 13, 2018, and by the time the matter came before the division bench, all encroachers had been evicted and the entire extent of land was under the possession of the Forest Department.

The division bench examined the provisions of the Act carefully. Section 2(o) defines “Other Traditional Forest Dwellers” as any member or community who, for at least three generations prior to December 13, 2005, was primarily residing in and dependent on the forest or forest land for bona fide livelihood needs. The Explanation to the section provides that each generation means a period of 25 years, making the required continuous period a total of 75 years prior to December 13, 2005. The Court found that this condition is mandatory, and a claimant must establish both primary residence inside the forest and livelihood dependence on the forest.

The Court noted that it was not disputed that the appellants were not residing on the subject land and were living elsewhere. While they claimed to be continuing cultivation activities, the Court held that doing some cultivation in a reserved forest area is not the same as being dependent on the forest for a bona fide livelihood. The Court also found that even in their writ affidavit, the appellants had not set out what agricultural activities they carried out or what forest produce they had collected for their livelihood.

Importantly, the Court held that commercial exploitation of forest land does not satisfy the condition of bona fide livelihood dependence on the forest. The relevant standard is cultivating for sustenance, meaning ploughing, irrigation, and planting for the purpose of subsistence, and not using the forest land in a manner that violates the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.

The Court further held that the appellants had not even established a semblance of a legal right under the Act. It noted that both the District Level Committee and the single judge of the Writ Court had examined the facts and documents in detail and had found against the appellants. The division bench found no ground to interfere with those concurrent findings.

The Court also clarified that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is to examine whether the decision-making process was in consonance with the applicable law, and not to substitute the decision of the competent authority. In the present case, the Court found that proper procedure had been followed and personal hearings had been afforded before the application was rejected.

The writ appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

Case Title: A.C. Murugesan & Ors. v. The District Collector & Ors., WA No. 1992 of 2023, High Court of Judicature at Madras

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