Gauhati HC Acquits POCSO Convict, Finds Foetal Age Contradicted Rape Timeline [Read Order]

Guwahati: The Gauhati High Court has set aside a life sentence and acquitted a man convicted under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, holding that medical evidence on the gestational age of the victim's foetus could not be reconciled with her own testimony on the date of the alleged assault.

A Division Bench of Justice Michael Zothankhuma and Justice Shamima Jahan was hearing a criminal appeal against a judgment by which the appellant had been convicted and, in view of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs.20,000/-, with a default sentence of two months' simple imprisonment.

According to the prosecution's case, the victim had lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge, Panery Police Station, on 17.10.2017, i.e. more than six months after the date of the alleged incident stating that she had been raped by the appellant on 11.04.2017 while returning from the paddy field with cattle, and was threatened against disclosing the incident. It was further alleged that the appellant made a second attempt on her about five days later but fled after finding the victim's younger sister present in the house. The Trial Court had accordingly framed a charge against the appellant for the offence alleged to have occurred on 11.04.2017 at about 4.30 p.m., to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In her deposition, the victim stated that the assault took place on 11.04.2017, that she became pregnant as a result, and that the child was subsequently stillborn, though her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. at the investigation stage made no mention of the pregnancy.

The principal ground of challenge before the High Court was medical. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the doctor who examined the victim on 18.10.2017 had recorded, on ultrasonography of her abdomen, a single live foetus of 35 weeks and 2 days, a gestational age roughly equivalent to eight months and three days. Counsel argued that working backward from that finding placed the date of conception in February 2017, nearly two months before the date on which the rape was alleged to have occurred, rendering it medically impossible for the appellant to have caused the pregnancy through the incident of 11.04.2017.

Examining the record, the Bench noted that there was no evidence of any assault on any date other than 11.04.2017, and that the victim's own testimony tied her pregnancy directly to that incident. Weighing the ocular evidence against the gestational age recorded by the examining doctor, the court found that the pregnancy could only have commenced in February 2017 before, and not after, the date on which the rape was alleged to have taken place.

Holding that the medical evidence on the foetus's age contradicted the victim's account of the date of the assault that led to her pregnancy, the court observed that “the evidence of PW-1 cannot be said to be trustworthy or truthful,” adding that the corroborating testimony of the victim's parents, who had also linked the pregnancy to the alleged rape, stood similarly undermined by the medical findings.

The judgment also recorded that although blood samples had been collected for DNA profiling to determine the paternity of the child, the samples proved insufficient for any conclusive finding, as per the entries made in the case diary. This was despite testimony from the victim's own mother and father, in cross-examination, that the appellant had repeatedly sought a DNA test to establish his innocence a request that could not be acted upon because the investigating officer was transferred, and one that the victim herself was stated to have been reluctant to accede to.

The Bench observed that there was nothing in the testimony of the victim or of any other prosecution witness to suggest that the assault had occurred on any date other than 11.04.2017, and that the entirety of the prosecution's case on causation rested on that single date. Since the medical evidence placed conception before, rather than after, the alleged incident, the court held that the foundational fact linking the appellant to the pregnancy and hence to the offence stood disproved, leaving the prosecution's version without corroboration where corroboration was most required.

Setting aside the conviction, the Bench held that “the prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant,” and acquitted him of the charges under Section 376(3) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, directing that he be released from judicial custody forthwith unless required in any other case.

The court further directed that the fee of the Legal Aid Counsel who assisted the respondent-victim be paid by the High Court Legal Services Committee, in appreciation of the assistance rendered. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Mr. B. Sinha, Advocate.

For Respondent No.1 (State): Ms. A. Begum, Additional Public Prosecutor.

For Respondent No.2: Ms. B. Sarma, Legal Aid Counsel.

Case Title: XXX vs. State of Assam and Anr., Crl.A./296/2025

[Read Order]