‘Gravity of Accusation Cannot Make Up for Absence of Legal Evidence’: Punjab & Haryana HC [Read Order]

Chandigarh: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed an NDPS case against an accused, even after charge was framed and prosecution evidence had begun, holding that the only material against him was the disclosure statements made to the police, which are barred by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and that the trial could have only one outcome.

Justice Manisha Batra, on 14 October 2026, allowed the petition under Section 528 of the BNSS and quashed FIR No. 0007 dated 12.01.2021 registered under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act at Police Station Kalanwali, District Sirsa, and the proceedings arising from it, including the charge framed on 23.01.2024.

According to the FIR, on 12.01.2021 a police party on patrol stopped a motorcycle carrying three youngsters, one of whom held a polythene bag containing 2,700 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride, for which they had no permit. They said they had bought the tablets that day from the petitioner, Harpreet Singh, and the FIR was registered against all four. Two of the three were found to be juveniles and were dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board, Sirsa, which on 14.02.2022 directed community service after they admitted their mistake. The third accused, who made a disclosure statement implicating the petitioner, died, and the proceedings against him abated.

The petitioner, who had been granted anticipatory bail, made his own disclosure statement on 10.07.2021, saying that he had bought the tablets from a person who could not be traced, and had sold them to the three. He pointed out the place of sale and produced ₹1,500 as the balance of the sale proceeds. A supplementary report was presented against him in December 2023, the charge was framed on 23.01.2024, and, as per the State’s reply, 5 of 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined.

The petitioner argued that he was not present at the spot and nothing was recovered from him, and that he was implicated only on the co-accused’s disclosure statement, which was inadmissible and could never be tested since the maker had died. He argued that no call detail record, money trail or independent witness linked him, as the State had admitted in its reply. The State argued that he was named in the FIR and the disclosure statement, that his own statement, the demarcation and the recovery of ₹1,500 established his involvement, that the contraband was of commercial quantity, and that the truth could be tested only at trial. It also pointed to another NDPS case against him.

On the stage of the proceedings, the Court relied on Bhajan Lal, Rajiv Thapar and Anand Kumar Mohatta to hold that the inherent power is not confined to the stage of the FIR and can be exercised after the framing of charge, though with greater circumspection. It held that the petitioner’s not having challenged the charge order was not a bar, as his challenge went to the legal admissibility of the only material against him and did not require appreciation of evidence.

The Court held that the co-accused’s disclosure statement, made to a police officer in custody, was barred by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and that Section 30 did not help the prosecution since there was no joint trial after the maker’s death. It also held that the statements of the juveniles to the police were barred, and that their admissions before the Juvenile Justice Board concerned only themselves, did not mention the petitioner, and were made in separate proceedings. It relied on Suresh Budharmal Kalani, Haricharan Kurmi and Surinder Kumar Khanna for the principle that a co-accused’s confession is not substantive evidence.

On the petitioner’s own statement, recorded after his arrest, the Court held that the confessional part was barred, and that only a “fact discovered” under Section 27 could be proved. It held that the place of sale had already been demarcated by the co-accused in January 2021, so the petitioner’s pointing it out six months later discovered nothing new, and that the ₹1,500 was not an object connected with the offence, as nothing identified the notes with the sale. The Court made it clear that it was not weighing the evidence.

Relying on Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat and Karan Talwar v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court held that such material cannot even justify framing of a charge, and that it makes no material difference that the charge had been framed and five witnesses examined, since no witness had supplied any other link. It held that the case fell within the first and third categories of Bhajan Lal and that all four steps in Rajiv Thapar were satisfied.

Rejecting the State’s reliance on commercial quantity, the Court held that the quantity recovered from the co-accused cannot make the petitioner answerable for it, and that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act govern bail and have no bearing on the existence of admissible evidence. It said that the “gravity of an accusation cannot make up for the absence of legal evidence”. His acquittal in another NDPS case could not weigh against him, and his personal circumstances, including that his wife works in Canada, were not the basis of the decision.

Holding that continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the Court, the Court allowed the petition, quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioner, and discharged his bail and surety bonds.

Appearances: For the Petitioner: Mr. P.K. Ganga, Advocate. For the State: Mr. Neeraj Poswal, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana.

Case Title: Harpreet Singh v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-47417-2025 (O&M)

[Read Order]