‘Killing The Messenger’ Stays FIR Against Journalist Who Exposed School’s Poor Condition: Allahabad HC [Read Order]

Lucknow: The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has stayed operation of a First Information Report lodged against a journalist for reporting on the poor infrastructure of a government school, holding that the FIR appeared to be a retaliatory and malicious act against the reporter for exposing shortcomings, and that none of the three penal provisions invoked against him were, prima facie, attracted.

The Division Bench of Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava was hearing a criminal writ petition filed by the petitioner, an accredited journalist, seeking quashing of the FIR registered as Case Crime No. 0319 of 2026 at Police Station Gosaiganj, District Lucknow South, under Sections 223, 353 and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with a direction restraining his arrest or prosecution and a direction to extend him the benefit of Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The petitioner's case was that he had visited Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Begriya Mau, Gosaiganj, Lucknow, on 20.08.2026 in his capacity as a reporter, and had found the toilets in a shabby condition, no drinking water available, and the overall condition of the school poor, and had also interviewed some teachers. Four days later, on 24.08.2026, the impugned FIR was lodged against him alleging that the school was in fact in excellent condition, that he had entered the premises without permission, interrupted the students' studies, and compelled two lady teachers to speak about the school's condition, allegedly out of political prejudice.

Counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 356 BNS, relating to defamation, could not have been invoked by way of a police FIR at all, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, that criminal defamation proceedings can be initiated only on a complaint by the aggrieved person, and pointed to Section 222 of the BNS, which bars a court from taking cognizance of the offence except on such a complaint. As regards Section 353 BNS, concerning statements conducing to public mischief, it was argued that the exception to the provision, protecting a person who publishes a statement believed in good faith to be true, was squarely attracted, given the photographs annexed to the petition showing the school's condition. On Section 223 BNS, relating to disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant, it was submitted that no such order restricting entry into the school had ever been issued, and that Section 215 of the BNS required a written complaint by the concerned public servant before an FIR could be registered.

The learned AGA, relying on instructions from the investigating Sub-Inspector, submitted that the school was clean in all respects and not facing any difficulty, and that a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS had been issued to the petitioner, but fairly conceded that no order promulgated by a public servant restricting entry, as required under Section 223 BNS, was on record.

Examining each provision, the Court held that the FIR under Section 356 BNS could not have been lodged straightaway in view of Section 222 BNS and the law laid down in Subramanian Swamy, since criminal defamation could be prosecuted only on a private complaint. On Section 353 BNS, the Court held that the photographs on record prima facie bore out the poor condition of the school premises and toilets, and that the authorities ought to have considered the good-faith exception before lodging the FIR. On Section 223 BNS, the Court held that in the absence of any order promulgated by a public servant restricting entry, and in view of Section 215 BNS requiring a written complaint by the concerned public servant, the authorities had erred in law in invoking the provision.

Referring to the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, and its Schedule prescribing norms for school buildings, including safe drinking water and separate toilets for boys and girls, the Court held that non-compliance with these norms by a government-run school amounted to a contravention attributable to the State itself, following the Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 133. It observed that it was for the Government to have remedied the shortcomings exposed by the petitioner rather than treating the exposure as an ego issue and lodging the FIR.

The Court held that the FIR appeared to be a retaliatory and malicious act against the petitioner for exposing the school's shortcomings, observing that this tantamounted to "killing the messenger," which the law does not countenance. Relying on the Supreme Court's orders in Abhishek Upadhyay v. State of U.P. and in Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, (2020) 14 SCC 12, on the constitutional protection afforded to journalistic freedom under Article 19(1)(a) and the need to protect journalists from being chilled by threat of reprisal, the Court found a prima facie case for interference.

Accordingly, the Court stayed the operation of the impugned FIR until further orders and directed that no action be taken against the petitioner pursuant to it. It further directed the Additional Chief Secretary, Basic Education, Government of U.P., to file a personal affidavit within four weeks indicating the present condition of the school, along with photographs, and stating whether any repairs or modifications had been carried out since the petitioner's report. The matter was listed after four weeks.

Case Title: Amit Yadav vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko and 3 Others, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 8913 of 2026

[Read Order]