New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India has held that the appropriate remedy for a legal representative aggrieved by an arbitral award is to file an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and not a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The Court further held that upon the death of a party to an arbitration, the legal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased for all purposes under the Arbitration Act, including the right to challenge the award.
The Court also clarified that denying a legal representative the right to challenge an award under Section 34 would defeat the very object of the Act as a self-contained and complete code of dispute resolution. It would render the legal representative remediless under the statute while simultaneously holding them liable to fulfil the award—an outcome that cannot be countenanced.
The judgment was delivered by a Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi on April 20, 2026, in an appeal arising from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, whereby the Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellant against an arbitral award had been dismissed.
The facts giving rise to the appeal trace back to a Deed of Agreement for Sale dated 20.04.2007, entered into between Mr. Appu John, alleged to be the paternal uncle of the appellant V.K. John, and the first respondent, S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF, for the sale of the subject property. Mr. Appu John passed away on 28.07.2007, shortly after execution of the agreement. In 2011, the first respondent initiated arbitration against the second respondent, A. Philip, alleging violation of the agreement. The appellant contended that A. Philip had been falsely shown as the legal representative of Mr. Appu John.
An arbitral award dated 21.02.2011 was passed by the Sole Arbitrator in favour of the first respondent, directing the second respondent to execute the sale deed. An execution petition was subsequently filed. The appellant submitted that he became aware of the arbitration proceedings only on 28.08.2012, following which he sought impleadment in the execution petition and was impleaded vide order dated 14.09.2021 of the Madras High Court.
Separately, in 1994, the appellant had instituted a suit against his uncle seeking partition of properties belonging to his paternal grandmother. In that suit, a preliminary decree dated 02.01.2018 was passed in his favour, granting him a one-third share in the subject property.
The appellant challenged the arbitral award by filing a Civil Revision Petition before the Madras High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition, observing that since the appellant claimed to be a legal representative of Mr. Appu John, the appropriate remedy lay under the Arbitration Act, and that in view of such statutory remedy, a challenge under Article 227 could not be entertained.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that since he was never made a party to the arbitration proceedings, he could not challenge the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which is available only to a “party” to the arbitration. He further submitted that the arbitral award stood vitiated, as he—having a substantial claim over the subject property—had not been heard, and that the arbitrator had made no enquiry as to whether the second respondent was in fact the legal heir of Mr. Appu John.
The third respondent, appearing in person, relied on the decisions in Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 75 and Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel (2008) 13 SCC 667, to submit that since the appellant himself claimed to be the sole surviving legal heir of Mr. Appu John, the appropriate remedy lay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The amici curiae, on the other hand, submitted that there was no binding arbitration agreement between the parties and that the award was not executable against successors-in-interest.
The Supreme Court, however, confined its examination to the question of law—namely, whether the appropriate remedy for a legal representative aggrieved by an arbitral award lies under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or under Article 227 of the Constitution/Section 115 of the CPC—without going into the merits of the arbitration agreement.
On this issue, the Court held that the Arbitration Act is a complete code in itself, consolidating the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Section 34 provides the sole avenue for recourse against an arbitral award, and judicial interference beyond its scope may be exercised only in exceptional cases, such as where a party is left entirely remediless under the statute or where clear bad faith is established, as held in Bhaven Construction.
On the question of whether the term “party” in Section 34 includes “legal representatives,” the Court examined the scheme of the Act. It noted that Section 2(1)(g) defines “legal representative” as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, including any person who intermeddles with such estate. The Court further noted that Section 35 extends the finality of an arbitral award not only to the parties but also to persons claiming under them, and that Section 40 expressly provides that an arbitration agreement shall not be discharged by the death of any party but shall be enforceable by or against the legal representatives.
Reading the scheme of the Act as one ensuring continuity of arbitral proceedings, the Court held that upon the death of a party, legal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased for all purposes under the Act. It relied on Rahul Verma and Ors. v. Rampat Lal Verma and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 578, and Ravi Prakash Goel (supra), to reiterate that legal heirs are bound by and entitled to enforce an arbitral award.
The Court accordingly held that when an award is enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased party, the right to challenge such an award under Section 34 must also necessarily vest in them. Any contrary view would defeat the object of the Act and leave the legal representatives bound by the award without a remedy.
The Court also noted an internal contradiction in the appellant’s stand: while he claimed to be the sole surviving legal heir of Mr. Appu John, he simultaneously disclaimed representing the estate of the deceased.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the impugned order of the Madras High Court was affirmed. The Court, however, clarified that the appellant would be at liberty to avail remedies under the Arbitration Act, and any such petition, if filed, would be decided on its own merits. The limitation period for filing such a petition was directed to run from the date of the Supreme Court’s judgment.
Case Title: V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (Died) Represented by LRs. & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Date of Judgment: April 20, 2026
Case Number: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 16162 of 2023
Citation: 2026 INSC 393
