New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that a man in a live-in relationship can be prosecuted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provided the relationship qualifies as a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' and the parties possessed the intent to marry.
A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh ruled that confining the word 'husband' in Section 498A to a man in a legally valid marriage, while excluding a live-in partner, bears no rational nexus with the object of the provision and offends Article 14 of the Constitution.
The appellant, and respondent no. 2, were stated to have married as per Hindu customs in 2010 and resided together in Bengaluru. The relationship broke down in 2016, leading to two criminal complaints against the appellant under Section 498A IPC and provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The appellant contended that no valid marriage existed between the parties and that Section 498A, being a penal provision, could not be invoked absent a lawful marriage.
The High Court of Karnataka had rejected this contention and refused to quash the proceedings, holding that the appellant had suppressed his prior marriage and represented himself as respondent no. 2's husband. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Also Read: Section 498A IPC Applies Even to Void Marriages and Live-In Relationships: Karnataka HC
It was argued on behalf of the appellant, supported by the Union of India, that 'husband' under Section 498A must be strictly construed to mean a man in a valid marriage, and that a woman in a live-in relationship was not remedy-less since the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 already covered 'relationships in the nature of marriage'. Respondent no. 2 and the amicus curiae submitted that the word 'husband' required a purposive construction consistent with the socially reformative object of the provision, and that a restrictive reading would allow perpetrators to escape liability through the very wrong they had committed.
Rejecting the submission that the DV Act affords adequate protection, the Court observed that the said legislation is essentially civil in character, and that treating it as a substitute for criminal protection under Section 498A would be 'a misstatement of law', since the impact of civil and criminal remedies on an individual is markedly different.
“This distinction between ‘married’ and ‘live-in relationship in the nature of marriage’, in as much as it relates to the protection envisaged by Section 498A, has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence and is as such offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
Invoking the right to choose a partner as an intrinsic facet of individual autonomy recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Court reasoned that cruelty inflicted by a partner or his relatives does not depend on whether the couple is formally married, and that denying equal criminal protection to a woman merely because she is in a live-in relationship amounts to creating an unreasonable classification without any intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object of the Section.
“When the objective of the Section 498A was to provide coverage to those cases where harassment by husband or in-laws through wilful conduct causing mental or physical injury or driving the woman to suicide, then to say that such harassment can only be caused when they are married and not before that, in our considered view, would be a case of over simplification.”
While extending the protection, the Court clarified that only those live-in relationships that are 'in the nature of marriage' and are further coupled with an intent to marry would qualify, since not every relationship satisfying the indicia laid down in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma is accompanied by an intention to enter matrimony. The initial burden of establishing such intent, the Court held, lies on the woman seeking the protection of the provision. The Bench also directed that the safeguards against arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar be strictly complied with in all such cases, given the recognised tendency of misuse of Section 498A.
“Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself, and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of this Section.”
Applying the above findings to the facts, the Court declined to quash the proceedings against the appellant, holding that the allegations, taken at face value, disclosed a prima facie cognizable offence and that the question of the true nature of the relationship was a matter for trial. The appeals were accordingly disposed of, with the Trial Court directed to proceed in accordance with law.
Appearances: Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, learned senior counsel, for the appellant; Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Additional Solicitor General, for the State of Karnataka; Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, for respondent no. 2; Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General, and Ms. Nina R. Nariman, learned counsel, as amicus curiae.
Case Title: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal Appeal No(s). __ of 2026 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026)
