Chennai: The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has acquitted a woman who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband, holding that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be invoked to draw an adverse inference against an accused unless the prosecution has first established the foundational fact of the parties being last seen together.
The Court set aside the conviction on the ground that merely being a wife does not mean that a woman will always be present inside the house, and that this remains a question of fact which must be proved by evidence, not assumed by the Court.
The Bench comprising Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice P. Dhanabal delivered the judgment while hearing a criminal appeal filed by the appellant Selvi, wife of the deceased Chellapandi, challenging the judgment dated 24.03.2023 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Virudhunagar, in SC No. 63 of 2018.
The prosecution’s case was that the appellant had developed an illicit relationship with a co-accused. The deceased, who was working in Tiruppur, returned to the village upon learning of this relationship and confronted both of them. On 29.09.2017 at about 2.00 a.m., while the deceased was sleeping, the appellant allegedly threw a grinding stone on his head, causing grievous injuries that led to his death. Based on a statement given by the father of the deceased to the Sub-Inspector of Police, an FIR was registered under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The trial court convicted the appellant, relying primarily on Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It reasoned that since the appellant was the wife of the deceased and was living with him, and since the incident took place inside the house, the burden shifted to her to explain what had happened. As she did not provide any explanation, the trial court drew an adverse inference and held the charge of murder proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Before the High Court, the appellant’s counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to examine any witness who had seen the appellant and the deceased together inside the house either on the previous night or on the date of the incident. Since this foundational fact was not established, Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not have been applied by the trial court.
The High Court examined the evidence of all the witnesses in detail. It noted that PW1, the father of the deceased who had given the initial statement to the police, turned hostile and did not support the prosecution. PW2, PW3, PW6, PW7, PW8 and PW9 also turned hostile. PW11, the son of the appellant and the deceased, was not present at the house during the incident as he was staying with his grandfather.
The Court then closely examined the evidence of PW4, the mother of the appellant, and PW5, a friend of the deceased, as these were the only witnesses the prosecution could rely upon. PW4’s evidence, the Court held, only spoke about the strained relationship between the appellant and the deceased and the alleged illicit relationship. There was no indication in her testimony about whether the appellant was inside the house when the incident took place.
PW5 stated that he met the appellant at 6.00 a.m. and again at 7.00 a.m. on the date of the incident. However, his evidence related only to events after the incident. The Court also found his evidence unnatural, noting that it was unusual for him to leave his work early in the morning simply to inform the appellant about money matters.
The Court held that, at best, the prosecution had established motive through the strained relationship between the deceased and the appellant. The conduct of the appellant after the incident was, at best, a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The Court also noted that the grinding stone, which was alleged to be the weapon, was found not at the scene of occurrence but 100 metres away in a thorny bush, and that the bloodstain on it had been wiped out before recovery. The chemical analysis report could not therefore be singularly relied upon against the appellant.
On the application of Section 106, the Court held that it is not intended to relieve the prosecution from its primary duty to prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution must first discharge its primary onus and establish the basic facts before Section 106 can be brought into play.
The Court held that just because the parties were husband and wife, the Court could not assume that they would always be together inside the house. Even in a matrimonial relationship, whether they were last seen together remains a question of fact which has to be proved by evidence.
Since no witness spoke about the appellant’s presence inside the house prior to the incident, the foundational requirement for invoking Section 106 was not met, and the trial court’s conviction could not be sustained.
The Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant of all charges, and directed that she be set at liberty, with the bail bond cancelled.
Case Title: Selvi v. The State
