The Supreme Court has dismissed appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the acquittal of two Central Excise Inspectors in a three-decade-old bribery case, holding that mere presence at the scene cannot, by itself, establish criminal conspiracy in the absence of cogent evidence of a meeting of minds.
A Bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale upheld the Allahabad High Court’s judgment acquitting the respondents, observing that “the demand for the bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act,” and that this essential ingredient was “absolutely lacking” in the case against the respondents.
The case arose from events of January 1995, when a Superintendent of Central Excise and two Inspectors inspected the premises of a private company in Barabanki and seized records without issuing any acknowledgement. The complainant, a retainer consultant for the company, alleged that the Superintendent demanded Rs. 80,000 as illegal gratification for the return of the seized documents. Following a CBI raid at the Superintendent’s residence on 14.01.1995, Rs. 60,000 was recovered from his bedroom and Rs. 20,000 from the pocket of his brother, who was also present. A chargesheet was subsequently filed under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Special Judge, Lucknow, convicted the Superintendent along with the two Inspectors and another co-accused in 2014. On appeal, the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, acquitted all the respondents, finding that the prosecution had failed to prove the foundational facts of demand and acceptance of the bribe.
Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the State argued that the respondents were present at crucial junctures, including when the initial demand was made and when the bribe money was recovered, and that since they were charged under Section 120-B IPC read with the substantive provisions of the P.C. Act rather than under the substantive provisions themselves, there was no requirement to independently prove the ingredients of Sections 7 and 13.
Counsel for the respondents countered that the Trial Court had convicted them merely on a presumption of conspiracy arising from their presence at the spot, and that one of the respondents, being a junior officer, was only following protocol by accompanying his senior. It was submitted that the prosecution had failed to produce a tape recording of the alleged conversation in which the bribe was demanded, despite the complainant having testified that such a recording was made, and that this constituted withholding of the best evidence available. Reliance was placed on Shyamal Saha v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 12 SCC 321, and on the requirement, recognised in State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi, (1972) 2 SCC 392, that abuse of position as a public servant is a sine qua non for an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act.
The Court extracted the High Court’s observations at length, noting in particular that the principal accused, despite being the alleged chief conspirator, had not himself been charged under Section 120-B IPC, and that the Trial Court’s judgment was riddled with words such as “Sambhavtah” and “Prateet hota hai”, reflecting that the conviction rested on presumption rather than cogent evidence.
Relying on its earlier decisions in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55, P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152, and Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 450, the Court reiterated that “mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the other circumstances under which it was allegedly paid would not by itself be sufficient to sustain conviction,” and that failure to prove demand of illegal gratification would be fatal to the prosecution’s case, precluding any presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act.
On the charge of conspiracy, the Court held that beyond alleging the respondents’ presence at certain places during the relevant period, the prosecution had produced no substantive evidence of a prior agreement or meeting of minds with the principal accused. Citing State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, and Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585, the Bench observed that conspiracy cannot be inferred merely on the basis of suspicion or association, and that the circumstances relied upon must give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement to commit an offence.
The Court also held that the prosecution’s failure to produce the tape-recorded conversation, despite the complainant’s own testimony about its existence, warranted an adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, relying on its decision in Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, where withholding of best evidence by the prosecution was held to justify such an inference.
Reiterating the settled principles governing appeals against acquittal under Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Bench emphasised that an order of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and that where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the evidence, an appellate court ought not to disturb a finding of acquittal. The Court held that the High Court’s view was “certainly a plausible and possible view arising from the evidence available on record,” and that no manifest illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice was made out to warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of demand, acceptance and criminal conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the Court dismissed the criminal appeals as devoid of merit, along with any pending applications.
Case Title: State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba and Others, Criminal Appeal Nos. 3383-3385 of 2025
