Minor's Consent No Defence; Rejects 'Romeo-Juliet' Benefit in POCSO Case: Calcutta HC

Port Blair: The Circuit Bench of the Calcutta High Court at Port Blair has upheld the conviction and ten-year sentence imposed on a man under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), holding that the “Romeo-Juliet” principle recognised by the Supreme Court could not be extended to him since the victim, an adolescent at the time of the offence, has since married another person and started a family.

A Division Bench of Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra was hearing an appeal against a judgment of the Special Judge, POCSO Court, convicting the appellant, under Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for ten years.

The facts, largely undisputed, showed that the victim girl, then aged about 17 years and 10 months, had met the appellant, aged 24, at a relative’s wedding in 2022. The acquaintance grew into a love affair, and the victim girl, without informing her family, moved into a rented house with the appellant. The two engaged in a physical relationship from December 2022 onward. When the victim girl later experienced health complications and was examined at a government hospital, she was found to be pregnant. Her statement to the police led to registration of an FIR under the POCSO Act on 22nd May, 2023.

Before the Division Bench, the appellant argued that the victim girl had not herself lodged any complaint, that the FIR was initiated by medical authorities and was riddled with contradictions, that no female police officer was present when her statement was recorded, and that the victim girl herself had turned hostile and supported his case. It was also urged that the couple had intended to marry once the appellant was released, and that the presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act ought not to apply since the delay of over a year in lodging the FIR remained unexplained.

The State, supported by counsel for the victim girl, countered that her evidence clearly established sustained cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the appellant resulting in her pregnancy, that her minority rendered any consent legally irrelevant, and that the medical and documentary evidence corroborated the prosecution case in its entirety. It was pointed out that the victim girl had since married another man who had accepted her along with her child, and that she was now living a settled marital life.

The Bench noted that of the thirteen prosecution witnesses, the appellant had chosen not to cross-examine several key witnesses, including the victim girl and her mother, whose testimony therefore stood effectively unchallenged. Once the factum of the physical relationship stood established and remained unrebutted, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act came into operation, requiring the appellant to prove that he had not committed the offence, a burden he made no attempt to discharge.

Addressing the plea of consent, the Court held that “a heinous and abhorrent crime of sexual assault, the consent of a minor cannot be treated as a mitigating factor,” observing that permitting such a defence would defeat the very purpose for which the POCSO Act was enacted.

The Bench also examined whether the “Romeo-Juliet clause”, a concept suggested by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Another, could mitigate the appellant’s case. While recognising that the clause was intended to protect genuine adolescent relationships from being derailed by the rigours of the POCSO Act, and noting that a coordinate Bench of the High Court had applied similar reasoning in Roshan Lakra v. The State and Another, the Bench held that the benefit could not be extended here. 

Since the victim girl had already entered into a matrimonial relationship with another person, applying the clause would not enable the appellant and the victim to build a life together, but would instead risk disturbing her present, settled family life.

Finding no perversity or contradiction in the trial court’s findings, the Division Bench upheld the conviction and sentence in their entirety and dismissed the appeal, directing that the trial court records be sent back and that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Special Judge and the correctional home concerned.

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Mr. Alokesh Sarkar, Advocate.

For the State: Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar, Advocate.

For the Victim Girl: Ms. Gloria Mary, Advocate.

Case Title: XXX vs. The State and Anr., CRA(DB)/4/2025