New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which prescribes "death or imprisonment for life," carries life imprisonment as its minimum punishment and must therefore be classified as a "heinous offence" under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and not as a "serious offence."
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan dismissed a criminal appeal filed by a juvenile challenging a Patna High Court order that had affirmed a decision to try him as an adult for the murder of another boy. The appellant, who was found to be 16 years and 4 months old at the time of the alleged offence, was accused under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC for allegedly slitting the throat of the deceased.
Counsel for the appellant argued that since Section 302 does not expressly use the word "minimum," the offence should be treated as a "serious offence" under Section 2(54)(b) of the JJ Act rather than a heinous one, relying on the fourth category of offences identified by this Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi.
Rejecting the contention, the Court observed, "A court convicting an accused of an offence under Section 302 of the IPC cannot impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life," holding that life imprisonment is, by implication, the minimum punishment prescribed under the provision.
The Court also rejected the argument that Section 21 of the JJ Act, which bars sentencing a child to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, should be read to cap the punishment under Section 302 at 14 years for classification purposes. It held that Section 21 "operates specifically at the stage of sentencing" after guilt is determined, and cannot be imported into the separate question of how an offence is classified for determining the forum of trial.
On a related question, the Court held that the word "may" in Section 101(2) of the JJ Act, which permits a Sessions Court hearing an appeal to take assistance of psychologists and medical specialists, is directory and not mandatory. It declined to extend the mandatory reading given to the proviso to Section 15(1) in Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, holding that an appeal under Section 101(2) serves a different purpose from the Board's first-hand preliminary assessment under Section 15, and that the Sessions Court may exercise its discretion "where the circumstances occasion the necessity of assistance from an expert."
On the correct approach to preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Court laid down that the Juvenile Justice Board must independently evaluate four parameters including mental capacity, physical capacity, ability to understand the consequences of the offence, and the circumstances of its commission and cannot rely solely on an expert's opinion. The Court held that the Social Investigation Report and Social Background Report "are not supplementary material, they constitute pertinent inputs for the preliminary assessment and must be accorded due weight alongside the expert opinion."
Applying this standard, the Court found that the JJ Board in the present case had erred by relying solely on the expert's opinion while making "no mention whatsoever of the SIR or the SBR" in its majority order.
The Court clarified that its observations on the Board's order were confined to whether the material before it was duly considered for preliminary assessment, and would have no bearing on the trial, which was to proceed uninfluenced by these observations.
Holding that no error of law had been committed by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, with parties bearing their own costs.
Case Title: X vs. State of Bihar & Anr.
