Andhra Pradesh: The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that municipal authorities cannot demolish private property for road-widening purposes without issuing prior notice and affording a hearing to the affected party, ruling that the power under Section 405 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1955, to remove structures without notice is enabling in character and must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, not as a general rule.
Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad allowed a writ petition filed by K. Sreenivasulu, whose two shops at Chinnachowk, Kadapa, were facing demolition at the instance of the Kadapa Municipal Corporation in connection with a proposed road development project.
The petitioner approached the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus challenging the proposed demolition of the shops. The petition contended that the respondents intended to demolish the shops without initiating acquisition proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and without payment of compensation, in violation of Articles 14, 19, 21, and 300-A of the Constitution of India and Sections 146 and 147 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955.
The petitioner’s case was that the land had been purchased by his father under a registered sale deed and that the shops constructed thereon had been assigned door numbers by the corporation itself. The area had, over time, become commercially significant, prompting the authorities to propose road widening. The corporation, however, proceeded only on the basis of oral instructions to the petitioner to vacate, without issuing any formal notice or following any procedure.
The Kadapa Municipal Corporation, through its written instructions filed before the court, justified its action by invoking Section 405 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1955, which empowers the Commissioner to remove unauthorised constructions and encroachments without issuance of notice where such constructions cause obstruction to a public road. The corporation contended that a draft Road Development Plan had been published in newspapers on 24 January 2026 inviting objections, that the petitioner’s property had been identified as encroaching upon the road area upon verification of Field Measurement Books and revenue records, and that the oral instructions issued were valid and in accordance with law.
The court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 405 of the Act, 1955, comparing it with the analogous provision under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which the Supreme Court had construed in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545. The court noted that Section 405 is almost in pari materia with Section 314, the two provisions differing only in minor respects with no bearing on the case. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s construction of Section 314, the court held that the provision is enabling and not compulsive; it permits the Commissioner to dispense with prior notice in appropriate cases but does not command that removal must always be effected without notice. The discretion conferred must be exercised in a reasonable manner consistent with the constitutional mandate of fair procedure.
The court further relied upon Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, (1997) 11 SCC 121, where the Supreme Court had laid down that where a corporation has allowed encroachments to remain for a long period of time, reasonable notice of at least two weeks or ten days, served personally or by substitution, must be given before removal. The court noted that where encroachments are of recent origin, the requirement of following natural justice may be dispensed with, given that delay in such cases rewards unauthorised occupation. However, where encroachments are long-standing and the authorities have themselves recognised the occupant by raising revenue from them, the entitlement to prior notice and hearing is not extinguishable.
From the two Supreme Court decisions, the High Court deduced a set of governing principles: that adherence to natural justice is not a rigid rule of thumb; that its exclusion is an exception and not the general rule; that each case must be decided on its own facts; that recent encroachments may be removed summarily while long-standing ones require prior notice; that where authorities have collected taxes or fees from occupants, a semblance of possessory right accrues, though it does not confer title; that for evicting lawful owners for a public purpose, acquisition proceedings under the relevant statute are mandatory and Section 405 cannot be pressed into service; and that when civic bodies initiate eviction drives, all state authorities must act in mutual coordination to achieve the purpose.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the petitioner appeared to be in long-standing possession of both shops and was asserting not merely a semblance of possessory right but a right of ownership traceable to a registered document. Under these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities not only to issue notice but also to provide a fair hearing before passing a speaking order in accordance with law.
The writ petition was accordingly allowed. The court directed the respondent authorities to follow the principles of natural justice and to conduct a fair hearing in view of the petitioner’s long-standing possession and his reliance on a registered title document. After the enquiry, the authorities were directed to pass a speaking order in accordance with law and communicate the same to the petitioner forthwith. The court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the case and that the respondents remained free to proceed in accordance with law.
For the Petitioner: Sri Vigneswara Reddy, Advocate, appearing on behalf of Sri V.R. Reddy Kovvuri, Advocate
For the Respondents: Sri P. Vengala Reddy, Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporations
Case Title: K. Sreenivasulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another [Writ Petition No. 3506 of 2026]
