New Delhi: Senior Advocates V. Giri, Gopal Shankarnarayan, J. Sai Deepak, and Gopal Subramanium advanced submissions on the relationship between individual religious freedom and the autonomy of religious denominations, with the Bench pressing counsel on the limits of constitutional review of religious practices.
A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Surya Kant, on Tuesday resumed hearing arguments in the Sabarimala reference (Day 6), focusing on the constitutional tension between an individual’s right to worship under Article 25(1) and the autonomy of religious denominations under Article 26. The Bench, comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, A.G. Masih, P.B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi, heard extensive submissions from four senior counsel appearing for parties supporting the review of the 2018 Sabarimala judgment.
“A believer must subjugate himself to, and submit to, the practices of the temple and the characteristics of the deity.”
— Senior Advocate V. Giri, before the nine-judge Bench
V. GIRI: AGAMIC LAW AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEITY
Senior Advocate V. Giri opened Day 6 arguments by emphasising that the essential feature of Hindu worship is idol worship, and that temples are constructed and consecrated under the supervision of the Agamas. He submitted that, under Agamic law, only qualified Archakas are entitled to enter the inner sanctum or touch the deity, and that no one else can enter the inner sanctum without risking the defilement of the deity. He argued that Hindu religious tradition considers the deity a living being, consecrated through specific religious ceremonies.
Giri contended that, since Lord Ayyappa is worshipped as a naistik brahmachari, any believer seeking entry must submit to the characteristics and practices associated with the deity. He argued that no one, including a believer, can act in derogation of those characteristics. He further submitted that the original petitioners had entirely failed to address the deity’s naistik brahmacharya as part of their constitutional challenge. Any State action that defiles the image of the deity, he argued, would interfere with the faith of Hindu worshippers and be void under Article 25(1).
Justice Amanullah posed a pointed question: if a believer approaches a temple but is told that, due to birth, religious identity, or gender, they will not be permitted to enter, would the Constitution not intervene to address that permanent disability? Giri responded that a person who is a believer cannot claim a right under Article 25(1) in antagonism to the belief itself; the right of entry must be exercised in consonance with the characteristics of the deity. Justice Bagchi pressed counsel further, asking whether a believer who thinks a particular practice is not rooted in the religion can challenge it. Giri maintained that a conflict between believers of the same religion cannot be envisaged, since each believer is expected to stand by the practice. Justice Nagarathna raised the question of whether the Court should be propounding the essential religious practices test at all, observing that if a practice is not strictly a secular practice, stricto sensu, it must be classified as religious.
SHANKARNARAYAN: HORIZONTAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE’S ROLE
Senior Advocate Gopal Shankarnarayan advanced a textual and structural argument rooted in Part III of the Constitution. He submitted that Article 14 casts an obligation on the State, not on temples or religious institutions, to ensure equality before the law. Similarly, Article 15(1) provides a remedy when a citizen is discriminated against by the State, not by a private religious body. He argued that Article 17, which abolishes untouchability, has horizontal application and is exclusively applicable to Scheduled Castes; it cannot be extended to other categories by analogy.
Shankarnarayan further argued that the phrase “other provisions of this Part” in Article 25 should be understood as referring only to other horizontal provisions in Part III, and that constitutional interpretation in this matter must be rooted in the text and structure of Part III as it existed at the time of adoption. He cautioned the Bench against the pull of majoritarian readings of constitutional morality, submitting that constitutional morality cannot be interpreted in a majoritarian manner. Justice Nagarathna observed that Article 25(2)(b) refers to all classes and sections of Hindus and does not include gender as a category.
J. SAI DEEPAK: LEGISLATIVE POWER OF SOCIAL REFORM AND DRAFTING HISTORY
Advocate J. Sai Deepak undertook a detailed examination of the drafting history of Articles 25 and 26, relying on the notes of B.N. Rau, K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, and Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer. He submitted that Article 25(2) was inserted as a limitation to Article 25(1) alone and has nothing to do with Article 26. His core submission was that Article 26 is a manifestation of Article 19(1)(c) in a religious context and is not a standalone provision; it is necessarily subject to Articles 25(1)(a) and (b).
Sai Deepak argued that K.M. Munshi had insisted that religious freedom would be meaningless if the clause equivalent to Article 26 were deleted, and that Dr. Ambedkar, despite being a social reformer, stood by freedom of religion under Article 26. Referring to the April 3, 1947 milestone in the Constituent Assembly sub-committee, he traced how the present Article 25(2) is equivalent to Draft Article 16, confirming that its limitation was intended to be confined to individual religious freedom and not denominational rights. He also flagged that if the word “class” in Article 25(2) is interpreted to denote gender, it would inadvertently compromise the position of temples where only Dalits are permitted to worship. He further submitted that denominational rights cannot be elevated to the status of minority rights.
GOPAL SUBRAMANIUM: EQUALITY ACROSS DENOMINATIONS AND THE AUROVILLE TEST
Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium began his submissions by arguing that equality under Part III can only be ensured if the protection of Article 26 is extended uniformly to all religious denominations. He challenged the definition of “denomination” adopted by the Court in the Auroville judgment, submitting that it was incorrect and that an institution must satisfy three cumulative tests to be classified as a religious denomination. He also questioned whether the definition adopted in earlier judgments could encompass multi-belief syncretic systems, citing the example of Sabarimala, where multiple faiths converge.
Subramanium argued that religious freedom is a facet of individual constitutional freedoms and that Ambedkar, if correctly understood, was a social reformer who nonetheless stood by freedom of religion under Article 26. Responding to questions from the Bench, he submitted that Article 26 is not a standalone provision; it is subject to Articles 25(1)(a) and (b). Justice Sundresh asked how all religious denominational temples could come under Article 25(2)(b), while Justice Amanullah asked counsel to read Article 26 and consider whether the terms “religious denominations” and “section thereof” must be interpreted in the sense of sampradaya.
CASE REFERENCE
Case: Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala Reference)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Hearing: 21 April 2026 (Day 6)
Bench: CJI Surya Kant and Justices Nagarathna, Sundresh, Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Masih, Varale, Mahadevan, and Bagchi
Counsel (Day 6): Senior Advocates V. Giri, Gopal Shankarnarayan, J. Sai Deepak, and Gopal Subramanium
