New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling, has held that where only two candidates contest an election and the returned candidate is later found disqualified, the runner-up is entitled to be declared elected. The Court held that ordering a fresh election in such circumstances would amount to a travesty of justice, particularly when the adjudication process has already consumed several years.
A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgment in a civil appeal arising out of elections to the post of Chairman of the Delang Panchayat Samiti in Odisha, while also disposing of a connected Special Leave Petition filed by the returned candidate.
The appellant, Ramadebi Rautray, and the respondent, Basanti Sahoo, had both contested elections in 2022 and were elected to their respective Panchayat Samitis. Thereafter, both contested the election for the post of Chairman of the Delang Panchayat Samiti, with the respondent being declared the returned candidate and the appellant finishing as the runner-up.
The appellant filed an election petition before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pipili, challenging the election of the respondent on the ground that she was disqualified under Section 45(1)(v) of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959, which bars a person who has given birth to a third child after the prescribed cut-off date from contesting elections.
Before the Election Tribunal, the appellant examined herself and two other witnesses, producing ten documents to substantiate her claim. The respondent, despite being afforded several opportunities, neither cross-examined the appellant’s witnesses nor led any evidence in her defence. The Election Tribunal accordingly allowed the election petition, declared the respondent’s election as a Panchayat Samiti Member void, and consequently declared the appellant elected as Chairman.
On appeal, the Election Appellate Tribunal upheld the disqualification of the respondent but set aside the declaration in favour of the appellant as Chairman, directing instead that a fresh election be held for the said post. Both parties then filed writ petitions before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, which dismissed both petitions and upheld the judgment of the Election Appellate Tribunal by its common judgment dated 15th December 2025.
Aggrieved by the denial of consequential relief of appointment to the post of Chairman, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. The respondent also filed a separate Special Leave Petition challenging her disqualification.
Counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent had deliberately avoided participating in the trial to delay the inevitable outcome. It was submitted that the orders closing cross-examination of witnesses were never challenged and had attained finality. He further argued that Sections 44-E and 44-J of the 1959 Act expressly empower the Election Tribunal to declare the election petitioner duly elected where the returned candidate’s election is set aside, and that in a two-candidate contest, no basis existed for directing a fresh election.
Counsel for the respondent contended that the Election Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and that the respondent had not been afforded adequate opportunity to contest the matter. It was also urged that the third child was in fact born from the respondent’s husband’s earlier marriage and that the respondent herself had only one biological child.
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent’s challenge to jurisdiction as not pressed on any valid legal ground. On the issue of disqualification, the Court affirmed all three concurrent findings of the Election Tribunal, the Election Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court, noting that the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses was a deliberate attempt to buy time, and that the uncontroverted evidence left no alternative but to uphold the disqualification.
On the central question of consequential relief, the Court examined Sections 44-E and 44-J of the 1959 Act. Section 44-E permits an election petitioner to seek not only a declaration that the returned candidate’s election is void but also a declaration that the petitioner herself has been duly elected. Section 44-J(2)(b) empowers the Civil Judge to declare another candidate duly elected in such circumstances.
The Court observed that since the election for the post of Chairman had been a straight contest between only two candidates, once the respondent’s election was set aside, no other contestant remained in the field. In this backdrop, the Court held that the Election Appellate Tribunal had committed a clear error in setting aside the consequential declaration in favour of the appellant on the premise that other members of the Panchayat Samiti ought to be given an opportunity to contest, and the High Court had further erred in affirming this reasoning.
The Court also noted that the elections had been held in 2022 and the litigation had consumed over three years. Requiring the appellant to contest a fresh election at this stage, despite having successfully challenged the disqualified candidate’s election, would be unjust and inequitable.
The Supreme Court therefore allowed the civil appeal, setting aside the judgments of both the Election Appellate Tribunal and the High Court to the extent they denied the consequential declaratory relief.
The Court restored the Election Tribunal’s declaration that the appellant was duly elected as Chairman of the Delang Panchayat Samiti and directed that consequential steps for compliance be taken within two weeks.
The connected Special Leave Petition filed by the respondent-returned candidate was dismissed in view of the findings recorded in the civil appeal.
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Shri Umakant Misra, Counsel for the Appellant–Election Petitioner
For the Respondents: Shri Kedar Nath Tripathy, Counsel for the Respondent–Returned Candidate
Case Title: Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha and Ors. (2026 INSC 243)
