The Supreme Court, while quashing criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act filed by a wife against her estranged husband and his family members, has strongly deprecated the growing trend of filing false and vexatious criminal cases as a tool to settle scores in matrimonial disputes.
A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan warned that courts and members of the Bar must actively discourage such misuse of criminal law, and called upon advocates to counsel their clients against initiating frivolous proceedings rather than encouraging them.
The case arose from a complaint filed in September 2024 by a woman against her husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law, alleging that her husband had made their minor daughter watch pornographic videos and then raped her at age fourteen, that her brother-in-law had raped the girl on multiple occasions, and that her mother-in-law and sister-in-law had beaten the child and threatened to kill her. The sister-in-law was additionally accused of inserting a hammer handle into the prosecutrix's private parts. The complaint was filed, nearly four months after the daughter had left the appellants' house and began living with the complainant.
The parties had been living separately since 2011, with the children remaining in the custody of the husband’s family. Over the years, multiple civil and criminal proceedings were instituted by both sides against each other, including cases under dowry and domestic violence laws, cross-FIRs alleging attempt to murder, and a divorce petition.
In the present case, the Trial Court took cognizance of the complaint in February 2025 and issued summons in August 2025. The Allahabad High Court declined to quash the proceedings, observing that the statements of the complainant and the prosecutrix did not disclose any material contradictions and that the allegations raised prima facie triable issues. The appellants thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Upon a careful examination of the complaint, the Supreme Court found that the allegations of rape against the husband and brother-in-law were wholly vague and generic. The complaint neither disclosed the date of the alleged incident nor described any specific act constituting the offence. The Court further noted that no medical examination of the prosecutrix had been conducted or placed on record, despite the complainant’s own assertion that the child had been residing with her for nearly four months prior to the institution of the complaint.
The Court observed that the natural and immediate response of any parent upon learning of such allegations would ordinarily be to seek a medical examination of the child. The complete absence of any such material, according to the Court, seriously undermined the prosecution’s case.
The Court also found the statements of the complainant and the prosecutrix to be deeply concerning. It observed that the prosecutrix’s statement before the Special Judge was virtually identical to the allegations contained in the complaint, reproduced in the same sequence, language, and tenor without any variation.
The Court remarked that when individuals narrate events at different points in time, some degree of variation is natural. The complete absence of any deviation, addition, or alteration in the prosecutrix’s version strongly suggested the possibility of tutoring by the complainant during the period the child remained in her custody prior to the filing of the complaint and before the recording of statements.
The Court found the allegations against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law to be equally unsubstantiated. The complaint did not specify the abusive words allegedly used, the nature of the threats extended, or the manner in which the alleged acts caused injury to the child. Even the serious allegation regarding insertion of a hammer handle was unsupported by any medical report, hospital record, or other corroborative material.
The Court observed that a vague and omnibus allegation, however grave in nature, cannot by itself justify the continuation of criminal prosecution.
The Court also referred to the Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report of 2013, which had underscored the importance of immediate medical examination in rape cases and emphasised that forensic evidence must be collected without delay. In the present case, this was entirely absent.
Going beyond the facts of the case, the Court expressed concern over what it described as a growing trend of estranged spouses initiating a series of criminal proceedings a “matrimonial bouquet” of cases against each other and their family members, not for genuine legal redress but as a means of harassment, pressure, and coercion to secure favourable settlements.
The Court observed that an especially disturbing recent pattern involves the filing of false complaints under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) by one parent, using a minor child as an instrument against the other parent and the latter’s family members. Such litigation, the Court noted, drags children into the centre of parental hostility, burdens the criminal justice system with avoidable litigation, and diverts judicial attention away from genuine cases requiring urgent intervention.
The Court reminded advocates of their social responsibility, quoting its earlier observation in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756, that members of the Bar must not allow exaggerated versions of small incidents to find their way into criminal complaints, and must make sincere efforts to guide parties towards amicable resolution rather than multiplying litigation.
Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint, the cognizance order, and the summoning order in their entirety against all the appellants.
It clarified that the observations in this judgment are strictly confined to the facts of this case and shall not come in the way of any other matrimonial or civil proceedings pending between the parties.
Case Title: Ishwar Chand Sharma & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (SLP (Criminal) No. 18035 of 2025)
