New Delhi: The Supreme Court has set aside the acquittal of an accused in a child sexual assault case under Section 376 IPC and the SC/ST Act, restoring the conviction awarded by the Trial Court. In doing so, the Court also took serious note of the repeated non-compliance by courts with the statutory bar on disclosing the identity of rape victims under Section 228-A IPC, directing all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict adherence to this prohibition in all pending matters, including those predating the Court’s landmark ruling in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 703].
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh delivered the judgment in an appeal filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh challenging the acquittal of the accused, Hukum Chand alias Monu, by the High Court.
The facts of the case relate to a nine-year-old girl who was sexually assaulted on 27 August 2007 by her neighbour’s son when she was sent by her mother to fetch buttermilk in the morning. Upon returning home, she described the incident to her mother and later to her father, who worked as a mason elsewhere. An FIR was registered, the victim was medically examined, and her bloodstained clothes were handed over to the authorities. Following investigation, a charge sheet was filed under Sections 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of sixteen prosecution witnesses and three defence witnesses, convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC and the SC/ST Act, awarding ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 for the rape offence, and five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 for the SC/ST offence. The Trial Court relied on the testimony of the victim, corroborated by her parents, medical witnesses, and the person from whom she had been sent to fetch buttermilk.
The High Court, however, reversed the conviction and recorded a finding of acquittal. The Division Bench found major contradictions in the witness testimonies that had been overlooked by the Trial Court. It noted serious improbabilities in the prosecution version—principally that the prosecutrix would have had to travel approximately 16 kilometres to and fro within two hours, which it found highly improbable. The High Court also noted that a quarrel between the two families over the alleged theft of grass and fuelwood had taken place on the very day of the incident, the delay in reporting, the fact that SC/ST Act charges and Section 201 IPC were added after the initial FIR, and material contradictions in the testimonies of the victim, her mother, her father, and her maternal uncle. It held that medical evidence alone, without corroboration, could not sustain conviction.
The Supreme Court set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. The Court observed that the High Court had merely attempted to pick holes in a case that had otherwise withstood the test of cross-examination. The prosecutrix had positively identified the accused and unequivocally stated that it was he who forced himself upon her, and not even a shred of doubt had been created by cross-examination on these two essential points. The testimonies of the mother and father, supporting the prosecutrix’s version, could also not be credibly questioned.
On the question of the 16-kilometre distance being improbable, the Court held that even if the alleged time frame is extended by an hour, the possibility of the occurrence of the offence remains unshaken. Proof of an offence within a particular time frame does not require mathematical precision. Further, the Court held that medical evidence, being corroborative and expert in nature, cannot be rejected merely because of a perceived improbability regarding distance. Since the expert evidence squarely corroborated the prosecutrix’s testimony of sexual assault, it could not be brushed aside.
The Court reaffirmed the settled legal position that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient to convict the accused in rape cases, provided it inspires confidence. Minor inconsistencies or trivial discrepancies in witness testimonies do not by themselves render evidence unreliable. The Court also cautioned that animosity between families is a double-edged sword and, if given undue weight, may lead to injustice in view of an uncontroverted victim’s testimony. Reliance was placed on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra [(2025) 8 SCC 613], State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh [(2019) 16 SCC 759], State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505], and Appabhai v. State of Gujarat [1988 Supp SCC 241], among others.
The Court also reiterated the principles governing the appreciation of testimony of child witnesses, as laid down in State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, noting that: no hard and fast rule exists for testing the competency of a child witness; the trial judge must guard against the possibility of the witness being tutored or influenced; corroboration, though not legally mandatory, is a counsel of prudence; and if a child witness has withstood cross-examination, the prosecution may seek conviction solely on that basis.
On the issue of victim identity disclosure, the Court expressed strong concern, observing that despite the statutory bar under Section 228-A IPC enacted since 1983 and the constitutional protection under Article 21, the name of the victim in the present proceedings was being used throughout the record as though she were any ordinary witness. The Court deprecated this practice in the strongest terms, noting that this was not the first time such non-compliance had been noticed. The primary reason, it observed, appeared to be the general indifference of the courts below and a lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences.
The Court accordingly directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 703] and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is strictly followed. The Court also referred to State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 384] and Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P. [(2003) 8 SCC 551], both of which had addressed the same issue well before the present incident.
The accused was directed to surrender forthwith and serve the remainder of his sentence.
Case Title: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand alias Monu [2026 INSC 290]
