Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked when efficacious statutory remedy exists under PMLA: Delhi HC [Read Judgment]

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court recently held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked when an efficacious statutory remedy is available under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), reiterating that where legislation provides a self-contained appellate mechanism, recourse to extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction is ordinarily not maintainable.

Justice Sachin Datta observed that where a statute creates a comprehensive framework with an appellate authority specifically empowered to adjudicate disputes, parties must exhaust such remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226. The court emphasized that the PMLA provides a complete machinery for redressal of grievances through the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal constituted thereunder.

The petitioners filed a batch of writ petitions challenging three distinct Provisional Attachment Orders (PAOs) issued under Section 5 of the PMLA. In W.P.(C) 895/2025 and W.P.(C) 1260/2025, the petitioner was M/s Krrish Realtech Pvt. Ltd., while in W.P.(C) 1791/2025, the petitioner was Mr. Amit Katyal, who owns Krrish group companies.

The petitioner company had initially approached the Supreme Court challenging the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, wherein no stay was granted in its favour. The Supreme Court, by order dated May 19, 2022, directed that status quo with regard to the possession of the plots in question shall be maintained. Subsequently, the Apex Court appointed Ms. Justice Gita Mittal, Former Chief Justice of the J&K High Court, as Special Referee to examine claims and counterclaims of all parties, including plot buyers. By order dated January 11, 2023, the Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the Punjab and Haryana High Court with a direction for expeditious hearing and reaffirmed the status quo order.

The petitioner’s case was that despite the subsistence of the Supreme Court’s orders, the Respondent Directorate of Enforcement registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) dated March 3, 2023, purportedly based on certain predicate offences arising from eight FIRs filed by homebuyers, primarily alleging delay in delivery of possession. It was submitted that at the time of registration of the ECIR, five of the eight FIRs had already been closed or quashed by competent courts. Subsequently, the respondent issued impugned PAOs dated August 6, 2024, October 17, 2024, and January 15, 2025.

The petitioner submitted that the present petitions were maintainable under Article 226 in view of the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(e), and 21. It was contended that the respondent’s action was in direct contravention of the binding Supreme Court orders. The petitioner further contended that the respondent had grossly concealed the status of the scheduled offence, as five out of eight FIRs had been closed or quashed before the ECIR was filed.

The petitioner also argued that the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA is required to comprise three members, including the Chairperson. However, the Confirmation Order dated January 29, 2025, had been passed by a single Financial Member, rendering the proceedings coram non judice and void ab initio. The petitioner submitted that the judgment in J. Sekar v. Union of India, relied upon to validate single-member proceedings, had been stayed by the Supreme Court.

By way of additional submissions, it was pointed out that subsequently, the Additional Sessions Judge, Saket, partly set aside the order of cognizance and directed the trial to proceed only under Section 406 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC, while quashing cognizance under Sections 409 IPC and 420 IPC. Therefore, no Scheduled Offence as defined under the PMLA survived against the petitioner. The petitioner further submitted that the ECIR revealed no reference whatsoever to FIR No. 30 of 2019, which formed the foundation of the investigation and the impugned attachment proceedings.

On the other hand, the respondent submitted that the petitions arose out of multiple FIRs registered against the Krrish group companies and their directors under Sections 34, 120-B, 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC. The respondent contended that the accused companies, under the guise of real estate development, had orchestrated systematic diversion and misappropriation of funds to the tune of ₹503.09 crore, which constituted proceeds of crime. The proceeds were routed through shell companies and transferred to various destinations, including Sri Lanka.

The respondent averred that the petitions had been rendered infructuous as the PAOs had been confirmed by reasoned orders of the Adjudicating Authority. PAO No. 06/2024 was confirmed on January 29, 2025, and PAO No. 11/2024 was confirmed on March 27, 2025. The petitioners had already filed statutory appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. The respondent submitted that when a statutory appellate remedy is availed, a party cannot simultaneously pursue parallel proceedings before a constitutional court.

The respondent further contended that two FIRs continued to subsist and remain under active investigation. It was further submitted that the Adjudicating Authority had already considered the issue regarding the quashing of the majority of FIRs and rendered specific findings. The respondent also contended that registration of an FIR is not a sine qua non for initiating attachment action under the PMLA.

The court noted that in two matters, the respective PAOs had already been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority, and the petitioners had preferred statutory appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. In the third petition, proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority had been concluded and judgment was reserved. In view of the existence of an alternative and efficacious remedy under Section 26 of the PMLA, the court held that the petitions did not merit interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The court held that it is a well-settled legal principle that where a statute provides a self-contained appellate mechanism, recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is ordinarily not maintainable. The court observed that Section 26 of the PMLA specifically provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The statutory scheme itself envisages that all questions relating to the validity, scope, and effect of an attachment order must first be adjudicated within the framework of the Act.

As regards the contention that the attachment violated the Supreme Court’s orders maintaining status quo, the court held that such an argument could also be appropriately raised before the Appellate Tribunal. All pleas of the petitioner, including those regarding jurisdiction and coram non judice, would necessarily be considered by the Appellate Tribunal. The court further noted that even the factual averments had been disputed by the Directorate of Enforcement, and a writ court cannot adjudicate upon contested questions of fact.

Consequently, the court held that it was not inclined to entertain the petitions, as an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy was available. All the grounds urged could be raised before the Appellate Tribunal, which would consider the same in accordance with law.

Accordingly, and without expressing any opinion on the merits, the court disposed of the petitions. The Appellate Tribunal was requested to consider and decide the appeals as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months. As regards the third petition, the court stated that in the event the petitioner is aggrieved by the forthcoming judgment, they would be at liberty to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority.

Case Title: Ms Krrish Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
Citation: 2025:DHC:9653
Case Numbers: W.P.(C) 895/2025, W.P.(C) 1260/2025, and W.P.(C) 1791/2025
Date of Judgment: November 3, 2025
For the Petitioners: Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal, Vikas Pahwa; along with six other advocates.
For the Respondents: CGSCs Ripudaman Bhardwaj, Nidhi Raman; Panel Counsel Anubhav Gupta, Vivek Gurnani; Special Counsels (ED) Zoheb Hossain, Manish Jain along with seven other advocates

[Read Judgment]