Kohima: The Gauhati High Court (Kohima Bench) has quashed the excommunication of 38 petitioners and their families from the citizenship of Yaongyimsen village in Mokokchung district, holding that the village’s traditional Putu Menden and the Yaongyimsen Senso Mungdang, though private and customary bodies, are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and that Articles 29 and 371A of the Constitution cannot be read as a blanket exclusion of judicial review over customary practices.
Justice Yarenjungla Longkumer was hearing WP(C)/90/2025, filed by Temjenchiba Longkumer and 37 others, all Ao Nagas now residing in Chumoukedima, against the Yaongyimsen Riongsanger Putu Menden (R-1), the Yaongyimsen Senso Mungdang (R-2), the State of Nagaland and its officials, and the Yaongyimsen Village Council (R-7). The petitioners challenged an Information dated 10.12.2024 issued by the Senso Mungdang, newspaper announcements of 21.10.2024 and 22.10.2024 in the Ao daily Tir Yimyim, and an Information dated 04.04.2024 excommunicating three of them.
The dispute arose over whether the Chumoukedima Yaongyimsen Union was established in 1989 or 2001. The Putu Menden dissolved the union’s office in March 2024 and directed that the “2001 group” run it. When the petitioners’ group refused, a meeting on 04.04.2024 ended in a scuffle and an FIR against three of them, which is pending trial. The Senso Mungdang then decided on 26.11.2024 that the excommunicated persons would lose village citizenship forever unless they returned within seven days, and the Information of 10.12.2024 barred them from marital ties with villagers, directed deletion of the name “Yaongyimsen” from their documents and certificates, barred them from entering the village and from identifying themselves as Yaongyimsen villagers in churches or civil or social organisations, and prohibited villagers from cooperating with them at times of death or celebration.
The Putu Menden and the Senso Mungdang objected that they are customary and private bodies, neither “State” under Article 12 nor performing public functions, and that the action was taken under customary law protected by Article 29 read with Article 371A. The Additional Advocate General for the State supported the petitioners and said the district administration had appealed to the bodies to revoke the excommunication without success.
On maintainability, the Court, relying on BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar (2015) 3 SCC 251 and Andi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691, applied the function test and held that a writ lies against a private body where it performs a public duty or the action has a public law element. It held the Putu Menden to be a traditional institution distinct from the statutory Village Council under the Nagaland Village Area and Councils Act, 1978. The Court found that the Information of 10.12.2024 affected rights beyond a voluntary association, with consequences for civil status, identity documents such as Scheduled Tribe and indigenous inhabitant certificates and other legally protected interests. It held:
“Even if R-1 and R-2 are not government or statutory authorities, because of their pervasive control over the Yaongyimsen villagers in the State of Nagaland, and due to the consequences of the impugned decisions made by the R-1 and R-2, these bodies are amenable to writ jurisdiction.”
On merits, the Court acknowledged that Article 371A expressly protects Naga customary law, but held that such protection preserves distinctive social practices and institutions and does not confer an unrestricted power to impose sanctions in the name of tradition. Relying on Lakshmibai v. Bhawantbuva (2013) 4 SCC 97, it reiterated that no custom is valid if it is illegal, immoral, unreasonable or opposed to public policy, and that Article 13 voids customs having the force of law to the extent they are inconsistent with Part III. It agreed with the coordinate Bench in Mangyang Lima v. State of Nagaland (2019 (1) GLT 409) that customary orders of banishment and excommunication violate Articles 19 and 21 and are not saved by Article 371A. Article 29, the Court added, must be read with the other provisions of Part III.
The Court held that the right to move freely under Article 19 can be restricted only by the State through a valid law and not by another institution. It noted that the respondents had not shown what customary law the petitioners had violated, and that their wives and children had nothing to do with the dispute. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay(AIR 1962 SC 853), relied on by the respondents, was distinguished as it concerned a religious denomination, whereas this excommunication was not for violation of religious norms so as to fall within Article 26.
The Court set aside and quashed the Information of 10.12.2024, both newspaper announcements and the Information of 04.04.2024 as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21. It held that the Village Council is not a necessary party and disposed of its application, I.A.(Civil)/146/2025. It expressly did not adjudicate the dispute over the date of establishment of the Chumoukedima Yaongyimsen Union, which involves disputed questions of fact, leaving any aggrieved party at liberty to approach the appropriate forum with the time spent in the writ proceeding to be excluded for limitation. The petition was allowed.
Appearances:
For the Petitioners: Mr. Imti Longjem and Ms. Catherine Anichar, Advocates.
For Respondents 1 and 2: Mr. T.B. Jamir and Mr. I. Jamir, Advocates.
For the State (Respondents 3 to 6): Mr. Imti Imsong, Additional Advocate General, with Ms. Mosemsa Longkumer, Government Advocate.
For Respondent 7: Mr. Apok Pongener, Advocate.
Case Title: Shri Temjenchiba Longkumer & 37 Ors. vs. The Yaongyimsen Riongsanger Putu Menden & 6 Ors., WP(C)/90/2025, 2026
