New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that electricity distribution and transmission entities can be made liable for deaths or injuries caused by electrocution on the standard of strict liability, and not on the higher standard of absolute liability, which admits no exceptions whatsoever.
The Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh was dealing with two connected appeals filed by the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited against a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court that had affirmed compensation awarded to electrocution victims under a writ jurisdiction.
The first appeal arose from the death of one N. Subramanya, who was electrocuted on 22 February 2018 while working with an aluminium ladder in a coffee plantation that came into contact with an 11 KV line. His widow, Rekha, filed a writ petition seeking compensation, which a Single Judge allowed, awarding Rs. 25,52,500 with six per cent interest, applying the compensation framework under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. A Division Bench upheld this award. The second, connected appeal concerned one Muizz Ahmad Shariff, who suffered severe injuries after coming into contact with a 66 KV line while retrieving a cricket ball from the roof of a neighbouring building. He was awarded Rs. 44,32,050, a figure similarly affirmed by the Division Bench.
Before the Supreme Court, the Corporation contended that the writ petitions ought not to have been entertained given the presence of disputed questions of fact, and that liability had been wrongly fastened upon it. Two questions fell for consideration: the maintainability of a writ petition for compensation in electrocution cases involving disputed facts, and the correct standard for determining both liability and the quantum of compensation.
On maintainability, the Court reiterated settled principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction despite the availability of alternate remedies, drawing on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. and T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers.
"An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law... In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition."
Turning specifically to electrocution cases, the Bench relied on the earlier ruling in Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, where it was held that the mere occurrence of electrocution from a snapped live wire does not, by itself, establish negligence, and that where the manner of the incident and the cause of the snapping are contested, the writ court is not the proper forum, the aggrieved party instead being expected to approach the civil court.
Applying this standard, the Bench catalogued the disputed facts in both appeals. In the first, these included whether the use of an aluminium ladder near an 11 KV line amounted to contributory negligence, whether the plantation owner who supplied the ladder was himself at fault, whether the backup relays were functioning as reported, and whether liability for the particular line voltage rested with the Corporation at all. In the second, the disputed facts concerned compliance with the statutorily mandated four-metre clearance between the electric line and the building, and the effect of an undertaking dated 19 April 2000 said to fix liability on the building owner.
The High Court had bypassed these factual disputes by holding that absolute liability, being exception-free, applied regardless of them. The Supreme Court found this reasoning unsustainable and undertook a detailed examination of the distinction between absolute and strict liability. It traced absolute liability to the Constitution Bench ruling in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (the Oleum Gas Leak case), which had fastened non-delegable, exception-free liability on enterprises engaged in hazardous activity.
"The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care."
By contrast, strict liability, traceable to Rylands v. Fletcher and explained by this Court in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, permits certain defined exceptions. The Court noted that the rule has been extended to electricity as a dangerous escaping agent, and that public bodies performing statutory functions, such as electricity boards, are not exempt from it merely because they act for community benefit rather than private profit.
The Bench held that, weighing the two standards, strict liability rather than absolute liability was the appropriate yardstick for electrocution cases, since electricity boards cannot invariably be said to be at fault, and since recognised exceptions, such as consent, common benefit, act of a stranger, statutory authority, act of God, default of the claimant, and remoteness of consequence, as enumerated in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., may legitimately apply depending on the facts of a given case.
On the yardstick for computing compensation, the Court held that the multiplier method borrowed from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as applied by the High Court, was inapposite to electrocution claims, following its earlier decision in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Since the Electricity Act, 2003 does not itself prescribe a method of computation despite fixing liability under Section 57, compensation in such cases is to be determined on the broader principle of just, fair and reasonable compensation, having regard to income and other relevant factors.
Having concluded that disputed questions of fact existed in both matters, the Court held that the writ petitions for compensation were not maintainable and set aside the judgments of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench. It clarified that this would not preclude the claimants from pursuing appropriate alternate remedies before the competent forum, to be decided expeditiously and without being influenced by any observations made in the present judgment.
The Court also directed that the interim compensation of Rs. 5 lakh already paid pursuant to its earlier order would not be recovered from the claimants, nor would it affect the final compensation, if any, determined in subsequent proceedings. Both appeals were allowed, with parties directed to bear their own costs.
Case Title : Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. Rekha & Ors. with connected appeal, Civil Appeal Nos. arising out of SLP(C) No(s). 24849 of 2025 and SLP(C) No(s). 24854 of 2025
