New Delhi: The nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India, led by Chief Justice Surya Kant, continued hearing arguments by the respondents on May 5, 2026, in the Sabarimala reference, with Advocate Ravi Prakash Gupta challenging the maintainability of the reference and Senior Advocate Darius Khambata addressing issues relating to entry, religious identity, and denominational control.
The bench comprises Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice A.G. Masih, Justice P.B. Varale, Justice R. Mahadevan, and Justice Joymalya Bagchi.
Background
On September 28, 2018, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala held by a 4:1 majority that the Sabarimala Temple’s custom prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of 10 and 50 years was unconstitutional, and that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted religious denominations to exclude women from public places of worship based on custom, violated the fundamental right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. The bench held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute a separate religious denomination and that the custom was not an essential religious practice.
More than 50 review petitions were subsequently filed. On November 14, 2019, a review bench, by a 3:2 majority, kept the review petitions pending and referred certain overarching constitutional questions to a larger bench, with Justices Nariman and Chandrachud dissenting. On February 10, 2020, a nine-judge bench upheld the referral order, and on May 11, 2020, published a detailed judgment substantiating the maintainability of the reference. The present nine-judge bench has been hearing arguments on the reference since April 2026.
Gupta: Reference Stretched Beyond Its Footing
Advocate Ravi Prakash Gupta, appearing for the Indian Young Lawyers Association, challenged the maintainability of the reference, arguing that it was made to unsettle settled law. He submitted that the five-judge review bench had referred the matter to a seven-judge bench and not a nine-judge bench, and that the speaking order did not refer the matter to a nine-judge bench. He further argued that a smaller bench cannot doubt the correctness of a larger bench and can only place the issue before the Chief Justice on the administrative side, not on the judicial side.
Chief Justice Surya Kant observed that the objection against the reference had been taken on record and that Gupta was not filing a review. Justice Nagarathna responded that the issue would necessarily require consideration of the seven-judge bench decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) and therefore warranted a larger bench. Justice Bagchi observed that the power of the Chief Justice to constitute a larger bench has been traced to Article 32 and is not governed by the Supreme Court Rules. Justice Sundresh told Gupta to move to relevant arguments.
Gupta also argued that the reference had not been registered as a reference case under the Supreme Court Rules, comparing it to the Presidential Reference and the Ayodhya reference, which were separately registered. The Chief Justice responded that this may be a good suggestion on the administrative side but did not affect the validity of the present proceedings.
Gupta: Right of Entry and Limits of Denominational Control
On the merits, Gupta submitted that the Constitution recognises three layers of protection — individual rights under Article 25, denominational rights under Article 26, and the State’s power to regulate. He argued that the right to practise religion under Article 25 extends to all persons and includes the right of entry into places of worship, provided the person complies with the rituals and practices followed there. Justice Nagarathna questioned this formulation, observing that those who have faith in the deity will perform all that is needed, and asked whether persons without belief could insist on entry.
Gupta further submitted that denominational autonomy under Article 26(b) cannot be placed beyond judicial scrutiny, and that Articles 25 and 26 must be harmonised so that the right under Article 25 is not reduced to a husk. He contended that exclusionary practices cannot be justified merely by labelling them religious, referring to historical practices such as sati to argue that reform has always been part of constitutional evolution.
The bench also questioned the basis of the original petition at several points. Justice Nagarathna asked how a juristic body such as the Indian Young Lawyers Association could have a belief or conscience, and questioned what good had come from the PIL, noting that it appeared to be based on newspaper reports. Chief Justice Surya Kant remarked that such material should have been rejected outright and that if there was individual misconduct, the proper course would have been to proceed against that person under law.
Gupta: Essential Religious Practices and Reform
Gupta submitted that what constitutes an essential religious practice must be determined by the denomination itself, relying on the Shirur Mutt decision, and contrasted this with Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961), where the Court assumed the power to exclude practices it considered secular or superstitious. He argued that labelling a practice as superstitious cannot become the basis for judicial interference and that the protection under Article 25(1) cannot be overridden on this ground. He further argued that even where reform is invoked under Article 25(2)(b), it must be read as part of the broader scheme of Article 25 and that there cannot be any custom that violates constitutional guarantees.
Khambata: Marriage Cannot Determine Religious Identity
Senior Advocate Darius Khambata argued on behalf of a Parsi Zoroastrian woman who had been excluded from Parsi institutions, including funeral rites, after marrying a non-Parsi under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. He submitted that such exclusion violates Articles 14, 21, and 25.
Khambata argued that the woman he appeared for was a believer and had not forsaken her religion, and that it would be far-reaching and would seriously undermine the dignity of women to suggest that such a marriage results in a deemed conversion. He pointed out that there is no prohibition on a Parsi woman married outside the faith from continuing to profess and practise the religion, and that no principle in Zoroastrianism prohibits interfaith marriage. He further noted that Parsi men who marry outside the faith and their children have been permitted entry into Parsi institutions. He submitted that there was no material to show that entry into a Parsi Agyari violates an essential religious practice. Justice Nagarathna asked whether marriage becomes the basis of discrimination, to which Khambata responded in the affirmative, calling it a man-made imposition and adding that such exclusions stem from decisions of particular trustees rather than religious doctrine.
Khambata: Article 26 Cannot Override Article 25
Khambata argued that denominational rights under Article 26 are sourced from Article 25(1) and cannot operate contrary to it. Justice Amanullah observed that individuals may practise religion privately while denominations represent collective belief, and asked whether there is a disconnect between individual and denominational rights. Khambata responded that while denominations have organisational autonomy, they must establish that they are genuinely part of the religion and act within its framework.
Justice Bagchi observed that Article 26 rights are textually confined to establishing institutions and managing religious affairs and that institutional practices may be protected differently from individual claims. Khambata submitted that primacy of denominational rights over individual rights would annihilate Article 25, and that a balance must be struck between Articles 25 and 26, along with Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21. He referred to Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) to argue that marriage does not extinguish autonomy or permit women to be treated as chattel, and submitted that constitutional morality must prevail and that equality is embedded in Article 25(1).
Khambata: Belief Not Beyond Constitutional Scrutiny
Khambata submitted that the meaning of religious denomination should not be applied rigidly, and that while common organisation, common faith, and common name are relevant, some element of uniqueness may also be relevant. Justice Sundresh observed that adding further criteria could create uncertainty.
Khambata submitted that while the essential religious practices doctrine has caused problems, it may still operate as an aid in determining what is integral to religion. Justice Nagarathna clarified that Article 14 does not directly enter the Article 25(1) space, but where a practice excludes a class, Article 25(2)(b) permits State intervention. Khambata warned that without retaining judicial review, Article 26(b) could be used as an instrument of domination over individual rights, and reiterated that elevating denominational autonomy above the constitutional balance would distort the constitutional scheme.
The Court will continue hearing the matter.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association and connected matters (Sabarimala Reference)
- Case Number: Not available
- Court: Supreme Court of India
- Bench: Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice A.G. Masih, Justice P.B. Varale, Justice R. Mahadevan, and Justice Joymalya Bagchi
- Date of Hearing: May 5, 2026
Appearances:
- For Indian Young Lawyers Association: Advocate Ravi Prakash Gupta
- For Parsi Zoroastrian woman petitioner: Senior Advocate Darius Khambata
