New Delhi: The nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India led by Chief Justice Surya Kant continued hearing arguments in the Sabarimala reference on 07.05.2026, with Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra, and Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta addressing the bench on questions concerning the limits of denominational authority over individual conscience, bodily autonomy, and constitutional rights. The day’s hearing gradually narrowed from broader questions of denominational autonomy and essential religious practices to the question of whether Article 26 protects religious authority even when its consequences affect dignity, autonomy, sexual health, and individual conscience.
The bench comprises Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice A.G. Masih, Justice P.B. Varale, Justice R. Mahadevan, and Justice Joymalya Bagchi. The reference involves, among others, the following questions: the scope and extent of judicial review with regard to religious practices under Article 25; the scope of the word “morality” under Articles 25 and 26 and whether it includes constitutional morality; the scope and ambit of the right to freedom of religion under Article 25; whether the rights of a religious denomination under Article 26 are subject to other provisions of Part III apart from public order, morality, and health; the meaning of the expression “sections of Hindus” under Article 25(2)(b); and the interplay between individual rights under Article 25 and denominational rights under Article 26.
Ramachandran: Excommunication Amounts to Civil Death
Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran addressed the bench on the practice of excommunication within the Dawoodi Bohra community. Reading from the N.P. Nathwani Commission report, he referred to instances of marital breakdown, social ostracisation, loss of employment, and exclusion from family burial grounds arising from pressure exerted by the Syedna. He pointed to one instance where a woman was asked to condemn her husband as a kafir after he contested elections against candidates supported by the Syedna, and submitted that fear of reprisal prevents victims from approaching courts.
Justice Sundresh responded that the question before the Court was how far it can intervene. Justice Nagarathna pointed out that the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 had already been repealed in Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (1962). Ramachandran replied that the five-judge bench in that matter had specifically recorded that the validity of excommunication remained unresolved.
Justice Bagchi noted that the Maharashtra Prohibition of Social Boycott (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2016 had not been challenged, and clarified that the bench was concerned only with the interplay between Articles 25 and 26 and whether a practice can survive social reform legislation. Chief Justice Surya Kant added that the Court was not examining individual disputes but the constitutional questions arising from them.
Ramachandran: Article 26 Cannot Extinguish Individual Conscience
Tracing the history of the dispute, Ramachandran argued that while the 1949 legislation was upheld in civil proceedings initiated by an excommunicated member, the Sardar Syedna case arose from an Article 32 petition filed by the Syedna, and questioned why the directly affected members of the community were not heard. Justice Nagarathna and the Chief Justice agreed that the community was a direct stakeholder. The Chief Justice remarked that the manner in which the writ petition was entertained was questionable.
Ramachandran argued that Article 25 protects individual freedom of conscience while Article 26 is only an expression of those rights through denominations, submitting that denominations cannot be granted extraordinary status over individuals. Adopting Senior Advocate Darius Khambata’s submissions, he argued that Article 25 can stand alone but Article 26 cannot. He submitted that excommunication extinguishes rights under Article 25(1) by preventing members from entering mosques, attending religious gatherings, and remaining within the community.
Justice Nagarathna observed that India remains a civilisation deeply connected to religion and warned that the Court’s approach could open the door to hundreds of petitions questioning religious practices. Ramachandran responded that India is a civilisation under the Constitution and that courts cannot adopt a judicial hands-off approach where there is a clear violation of fundamental rights.
He submitted that while religions may impose discipline, courts must intervene where the consequences destroy dignity and liberty. Justice Amanullah questioned whether courts could examine proportionality once a practice carried even a slight religious element and warned against dilution of Article 26 protection. Justice Nagarathna asked whether excommunication is ultimately a secular or a religious act. Ramachandran responded that even where the trigger for excommunication appears religious, courts can intervene if its impact disproportionately affects dignity and liberty, relying on Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) to argue that practices which are mainly secular fall outside both provisions.
Ramachandran: Constitutional Morality Is a Tool, Not a Test
Relying on then Chief Justice B.P. Sinha’s dissent in Sardar Syedna, Ramachandran argued that Article 25(1) protects individuals against coercive denominational practices imposed on pain of penalties like excommunication. He submitted that the 1949 legislation was intended to prevent persons from being reduced to pariahs within their own community, and pointed to Chief Justice Sinha’s observation that the consequences of excommunication resembled untouchability. Constituent Assembly debates were cited to argue that Article 25(2)(b) was consciously introduced to permit curtailment of harmful practices.
Ramachandran submitted that if the expression constitutional morality was considered irritating, courts could instead use constitutional ethos, emphasising that what matters are the core constitutional values that guide interpretation, and that questioning constitutional morality is akin to questioning the basic structure doctrine. Justice Bagchi observed that constitutional morality could not become the touchstone to test either legislation or religion and that courts must instead identify violations of specific constitutional guarantees. Ramachandran agreed.
Ramachandran also strongly urged the bench to refrain from engaging with the maintainability issue, calling it a note of protest and submitting that time limits for addressing that question had already been crossed.
Luthra: A Denomination Cannot Become an Empty Shell
Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra argued that Article 26 cannot override the fundamental rights of the very individuals who constitute the denomination. Describing India as a country of diametric plurality, he submitted that constitutional adjudication must account for inter and intra-individual plurality, or the coexistence of multiple and overlapping religious influences. Referring to Article 26(b), he said denominations are entitled to frame institutional rules governing internal affairs but cannot extend control over the spiritual lives of members in contravention of their fundamental rights. He submitted that if individuals are excluded for non-conformity, all that remains is an empty shell of the denomination. He argued that Article 25 does not require doctrinal purity and must be read alongside the limitations of public order, morality, health, and the other provisions of Part III.
Luthra: Mutilation of a Vital Organ Cannot Claim Constitutional Protection
Luthra submitted that certain practices necessarily fall foul of constitutional limitations, and addressed the practice of female genital mutilation. He submitted that the procedure involves removal of the skin surrounding the clitoris at the age of seven, affecting a part of the body containing around 10,000 nerve endings. Justice Bagchi described FGM as mutilation of a vital organ affecting reproductive health and sexual autonomy, while Justice Nagarathna added that it also implied morality. Luthra pointed out that the practice was not confined to one community, historically predated organised religions, and existed among sections of Sunni Muslims in Kerala, Coptic Christians, and communities elsewhere across the world. He noted that while no specific Indian legislation bans FGM, around 59 countries have prohibited the practice and courts in countries such as Egypt and Australia have passed judicial orders against it.
Justice Amanullah observed that the very expression itself indicated distortion of human anatomy and served no beneficial purpose. Luthra added that the issue becomes more serious because it is performed on minors incapable of consent.
Advocate Nizam Pasha, appearing for the review petitioners, denied that any worldly or religious sanction attached to non-observance and argued that the practice was not mutilation but a symbolic form of circumcision. Justice Bagchi responded that male circumcision could not be equated with genital cutting involving the clitoris, while Justice Amanullah remarked that if FGM is compulsory, the bench would have to adjudicate on that basis.
Luthra: Articles 25 and 26 Cannot Override Part III
Referring to minors subjected to FGM, Luthra submitted that the issue involved unequal power relations, similar to those recognised in sexual offence jurisprudence and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997). Justice Amanullah and Chief Justice Surya Kant observed that Luthra appeared to be advancing a novel proposition that Articles 25 and 26 could not be given an overriding effect where they violate individual rights. Luthra clarified that he was not treating those rights as absolute and that courts would still need to adjudicate on a case-to-case basis. Justice Nagarathna suggested that necessary limitations already existed within Article 25(1). Luthra agreed but added that both articles are expressly subject to the other provisions of Part III.
Gupta: Accumulated Constitutional Wisdom Must Guide the Reference
Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta, appearing for the State of Kerala, argued that the Court must not depart from accumulated constitutional wisdom developed over 75 years. Relying on the doctrine of precedent and referring to the House of Lords decision in Bourne v. Keane, later accepted in Indian jurisprudence, he submitted that courts may only depart from precedent if it is plainly erroneous or produces injustice or inefficiency. He stressed that when courts interpret Articles 25 and 26, they do so in the context of constitutional governance and policy rather than theology.
Gupta: Essential Religious Practices Are Determined Through Evidence
Gupta submitted that religion need not be exhaustively defined in the Constitution as courts receive sufficient guidance on a case-by-case basis, and that the essential religious practices doctrine is not an addition to the Constitution but an exercise in interpretation. Justice Nagarathna asked who ultimately decides whether a practice is essential. Referring to Shirur Mutt and Durgah Committee, Gupta replied that courts have long determined essentiality through evidence and expert testimony, and Justice Nagarathna observed that the exercise resembled proof of custom and usage.
When Gupta interpreted Article 25 to mean that nobody’s right is higher than another’s, Justice Bagchi remarked that the constitutional scheme similarly provides that nobody’s conscience is superior to another’s. Gupta referred to disputes concerning cow slaughter, Ram Janmabhoomi, Parasnath Hill, and the Kamakhya Temple to illustrate the operation of the essential religious practices test, and submitted that some principle of resolution becomes necessary in cases of conflict between rights, such as the doctrine of harmonious construction adopted in Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore (1957).
The hearing will resume on 12.05.2026.
Case Details
- Case Title: Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association and connected matters (Sabarimala Reference)
- Court: Supreme Court of India
- Bench: Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice A.G. Masih, Justice P.B. Varale, Justice R. Mahadevan, and Justice Joymalya Bagchi
- Date of Hearing: 07.05.2026
Appearances:
For Respondents: Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran;
Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra; Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta (for State of Kerala)
For Review Petitioners: Advocate Nizam Pasha
