Can a 150-Year-Old British Law Still Apply to Nagaland? Gauhati High Court Answers

Gauhati: The Gauhati High Court has upheld the extension of the Inner Line Permit (ILP) regime to Dimapur, Chumoukedima and Niuland districts of Nagaland, holding that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, a colonial-era statute, continues to operate as valid law by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution and remains a sufficient legal basis for restricting freedom of movement and residence under Article 19(5).

A Division Bench of Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury dismissed three connected Public Interest Litigations challenging the ILP extension, holding that the impugned notifications were traceable to statutory authority and satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness.

The PILs assailed Notification No. CON-3/PAP/65/10 dated 20th September 2024, which extended the ILP regime to Dimapur, Chumoukedima and Niuland, and Notification No. DC/ILP-1/2018-D/PT/1459 dated 27th May 2025, which prescribed the documentary requirements for grant of ILP. PIL No.22/2025 and its connected PIL No.67/2025 were filed by a resident of Dimapur, while PIL No.29/2025 was filed by three individuals belonging to the Dimasa and Karbi tribes, residents of Assam, espousing the interests of their communities in the adjoining districts of Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong.

For the petitioners, it was argued that the notifications imposed a substantive restriction on movement and residence through executive action unsupported by valid law, since restrictions under Article 19(5) could be imposed only by a law satisfying that provision, and that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, being a colonial enactment conceived under a wholly different constitutional order, could not today furnish a valid basis for restricting Part III freedoms. It was further contended that Dimapur had been consciously kept outside the ILP regime for decades to facilitate trade and economic integration, that its sudden inclusion was arbitrary and unsupported by quantifiable data, and that Article 371A remained subject to Part III of the Constitution. The petitioners in PIL No.29/2025 additionally highlighted the historical, familial and cultural ties of the Dimasa community with Dimapur, tracing back to the Kachari kingdom, and argued that insistence on NRC-related documentation for ILP created an impossible condition of compliance since the NRC process in Assam had not attained finality.

The State of Nagaland, represented by the learned Advocate General, defended the notifications as traceable to Section 2 of the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, which, it was submitted, continues as law under Article 372 of the Constitution and the Adaptation of Laws Orders. The State relied on the historical status of the Naga Hills as a protected frontier region, Article 29(1) of the Constitution, and the district's declaration as a disturbed area under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, to justify the measure as addressing concerns of unchecked migration, public security and protection of indigenous interests.

On the threshold question of the Regulation's continuing legal status, the Court held that constitutional adjudication could not proceed merely on the historical origins of a statute, and that the relevant question was whether it continued to derive force of law from the Constitution. The Court held:

“Article 372 does not merely preserve executive practice; it preserves laws… It derives its Post-Constitution legitimacy not from the colonial authority that originally created it, but from the constitution.”

Distinguishing the appellant's reliance on Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182, as arising in an entirely different context of repugnancy and continuity of a temporary enactment, the Court held that the Regulation retained the character of primary legislation notwithstanding its pre-Constitution vintage, and that the impugned notifications, being an exercise of delegated statutory authority traceable to Section 2 of the Regulation, could not be characterised as mere executive fiat.

Testing the notifications against the reasonableness standard laid down in State of Madras v. V.G. Row, (1952) 1 SCC 410, the Court found that the measure was regulatory rather than prohibitory in character, did not bar entry into or permanent residence in the three districts, and bore a rational nexus with the constitutionally recognised objectives of protecting Scheduled Tribe interests and addressing migration and security concerns, particularly given Dimapur's status as a disturbed area under the AFSPA. Rejecting the argument that such considerations fell outside the expression “interest of the general public” in Article 19(5), the Court observed:

“The impact of large-scale migration is not confined to the question of individual movement alone. It may have implications for land resources, employment opportunities, cultural preservation, demographic balance, public administration and the protection of vulnerable communities.”

The Court further held that Article 371A, while not overriding Part III, formed part of the constitutional context in which the reasonableness of the measure fell to be assessed, and that the petitioners' reliance on R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324, did not assist them since the challenge did not implicate Article 371A itself. On the plea of arbitrariness under Article 14, the Court noted that the notification classified residents into three historically grounded categories, namely those settled before 1st December 1963, those settled between 2nd December 1963 and 21st November 1979, and those entering thereafter, with the first two categories exempted from ILP and eligible for Permanent Resident Certificates. This graduated classification, the Court held, bore a direct nexus with the object of balancing indigenous protection against the legitimate expectations of settled residents, satisfying the test of reasonable classification and distinguishing the petitioners' reliance on Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59, and Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1.

The Court also rejected the argument, founded on M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, that the extension required quantifiable data, holding that the requirement of such data in Nagaraj arose in the distinct context of reservation under Articles 16(4), 16(4A) and 16(4B), and that, in any event, the Advocate General had placed on record committee reports, departmental deliberations and successive Cabinet decisions preceding the impugned notifications, showing the decision was not taken in an evidentiary vacuum. On the Dimasa and Karbi petitioners' historical claims, the Court held that constitutional adjudication proceeds on existing constitutional arrangements rather than competing claims of pre-colonial sovereignty, and that the notification did not bar entry but merely subjected it to a permit mechanism.

On the grievance regarding NRC documentation, the learned Advocate General, after consultation with the State Government, informed the Court that for applicants from the Cachar, Hailakandi, Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong districts of Assam, the authorities would not insist on a final NRC registration document, and that a downloadable 'Receipt of Claim' bearing the applicant's ARN number would be treated as sufficient for processing ILP applications. The Court recorded this statement, holding that the apprehension raised in PIL No.29/2025 stood substantially addressed and no longer survived for adjudication. The Court also noted that a similar challenge to the ILP regime, filed before the Supreme Court by Advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, had been dismissed on 2nd July 2019, and flagged, without returning a finding, the petitioners' obligation of candour in disclosing such prior proceedings while invoking PIL jurisdiction.

Holding that the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873 continues as law under Article 372, that the impugned notifications derive authority from it rather than constituting executive fiat, and that the extension of the ILP regime withstands scrutiny under both Articles 14 and 19, the Court dismissed all three petitions, vacated any interim orders, and made no order as to costs.

Appearances: Mr. K.N. Choudhury, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. K. Mohammed, appeared for the petitioners in PIL Nos.22/2025 and 67/2025. Mr. S. Borthakur, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. V. Rajkhowa, appeared for the petitioners in PIL No.29/2025. Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Advocate General, Nagaland, assisted by Ms. M. Kechii and Ms. T. Khro, Additional Advocates General, Nagaland, along with Ms. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Nitya Nambiar, Ms. Y. Bhusan Aggarwal, Ms. V. Kense, Ms. L.A. Shishak and Ms. S. Singh, Advocates, appeared for the State of Nagaland. Mr. S.K. Medhi, CGC, appeared for the Union of India.

Case Title: Kiron Paira v. Union of India and Others, with connected PIL No.67/2025 (Kiron Paira v. Union of India and 5 Ors.) and PIL No.29/2025 (Uttam Bathari and Others v. Union of India and Others) | PIL/22/2025 | The Gauhati High Court | Decided on 16th June 2026